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DOES "UNLAWFUL" MEAN "CRIMINAL"?:
REFLECTIONS ON THE DISAPPEARING TORT/
CRIME DISTINCTION IN AMERICAN LAWt
JOHN C. COFFEE, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
What sense does it make to insist upon procedural safeguards in crimi-
nal prosecutions if anything whatever can be made a crime in the first
place?'
Professor Henry M. Hart, Jr.
My thesis is simple and can be reduced to four assertions. First, the domi-
nant development in substantive federal criminal law over the last decade
has been the disappearance of any clearly definable line between civil and
criminal law. Second, this blurring of the border between tort and crime
predictably will result in injustice, and ultimately will weaken the efficacy of
the criminal law as an instrument of social control. Third, to define the
proper sphere of the criminal law, one must explain how its purposes and
methods differ from those of tort law. Although it is easy to identify distin-
guishing characteristics of the criminal law--e.g., the greater role of intent in
the criminal law, the relative unimportance of actual harm to the victim, the
special character of incarceration as a sanction, and the criminal law's
greater reliance on public enforcement2-none of these is ultimately decisive.
Rather, the factor that most distinguishes the criminal law is its operation as
a system of moral education and socialization. The criminal law is obeyed
not simply because there is a legal threat underlying it, but because the pub-
t © 1991 John C. Coffee, Jr.
* Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School.
' Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1958, at
401, 431. Professor Hart, the principal founder of the Legal Process school, went on to
add in a tone bordering on scorn:
Despite the unmistakable indications that the Constitution means something definite
and something serious when it speaks of "crime," the Supreme Court of the United
States has hardly got [sic] to first base in working out what that something is. From
beginning to end, there is scarcely a single opinion by any member of the Court
which confronts the question in a fashion which deserves intellectual respect.
Id.
2 Epstein, Crime and Tort: Old Wine in Old Bottles, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL:
RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION AND THE LEGAL PRocEss 231, 248 (R. Barnett & J. Hagel
eds. 1977).
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lic perceives its norms to be legitimate and deserving of compliance.3 Far
more than tort law, the criminal law is a system for public communication of
values. As a result, the criminal law often and necessarily displays a deliber-
ate disdain for the utility of the criminalized conduct to the defendant.
Thus, while tort law seeks to balance private benefits and public costs, crimi-
nal law does not (or does so only by way of special affirmative defenses),
possibly because balancing would undercut the moral rhetoric of the crimi-
nal law. Characteristically, tort law prices, while criminal law prohibits.4
The fourth and final assertion of this Article is that implementation of the
crime/tort distinction is today feasible only at the sentencing stage. Neither
legislative action nor constitutional challenge is likely to reverse the
encroachment of the criminal law upon areas previously thought civil in
character. But, at the sentencing stage, courts can draw a line between the
enforcement of norms that were intended to price and those intended to pro-
hibit. Indeed, because a sensible implementation of the crime/tort distinc-
tion requires a close retrospective evaluation of the defendant's conduct,
sentencing may be the only juncture where the distinction can be feasibly
preserved.
None of these assertions can be proven in a dispositive manner; nor will
this Article attempt to do so. But, given the plausibility of these assertions,
their implications need to be examined and assessed. In particular, the dis-
tinction between pricing and prohibiting carries several important implica-
tions for the structure of criminal justice. First, it sets boundaries by
implying that the criminal law should generally not be used when society is
unprepared to disregard the social utility of the defendant's behavior-that
is, when it prefers to "price" the behavior in question in order to force inter-
nalization of social costs. Thus, more specifically, it suggests that criminal
liability for negligence is generally inappropriate. Second, once it is recog-
nized that society generally intends to prohibit behavior through the crimi-
nal law, it follows that there cannot be an "optimal" rate of crime that is to
be attained by pricing the subject behavior. As a result, Learned Hand's
famous rule for determining tort liability does not properly apply to criminal
3 The limited empirical evidence supports this claim. See T. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE
OBEY THE LAW (1990) (using survey research to find that the public complies with the
criminal law based not on its deterrent threat, but its moral legitimacy).
4 I recognize, of course, that most crimes involving specific victims are also torts.
There is thus an inherent overlap between tort law and criminal law in terms of subject
matter. Moreover, tort law sometimes seeks to deter by imposing punitive damages,
which clearly are intended to prohibit, rather than price. Usually, tort law does so based
on a sense that the community's moral standards have been egregiously violated. My
claim then is not that tort law only prices and criminal law only prohibits, but that each
has a dominant tendency that explains much of its institutional and doctrinal structure.
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law.' Although some economists, most notably Gary Becker,6 have
advanced such a "pricing" model of the criminal law, the rival view implied
by this pricing/prohibiting distinction is that only enforcement costs justify
allowing the "optimal" rate of crime to exceed zero-at least with respect to
the "true" crimes that society wishes to prohibit, not price. Because society
has refused on moral grounds to recognize the legitimacy of the benefit to
the defendant in these cases, then by definition the benefits of the crime to
the individual can never exceed the costs it imposes on society.7 Thus, the
criminal law threatens the defendant with a much sharper, more discontinu-
ous jump in the costs that the defendant will incur for its violation than does
tort law, because the criminal law has little reason to fear overdeterrence
(that is, the chilling of socially valuable behavior) within its appropriate
domain.
Fundamental as the distinction between pricing and prohibiting misbehav-
ior may be, there are still cases that fall on the borderline. Chief among
these is the problem of corporate criminal liability. Essentially, corporate
criminal liability (at least as recognized in the United States) is a species of
vicarious criminal liability; that is, the principal is held liable for the acts of
its agent--even when the principal makes a substantial good faith attempt to
monitor the agent and prevent the illegality. 8 Conceptually, vicarious crimi-
nal liability for failing to prevent the agent from acting illegally seems a form
5 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). The
Hand formula can be stated as an obligation to invest in precautions up to the point
where the marginal costs to the actor equal the marginal benefits to the victims in terms
of reduced expected losses.
6 Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. EcON. 169
(1968).
7 This point has been made well by Professor Dau-Schmidt. See Dau-Schmidt, An
Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J.
1, 11-13. Professor Dau-Schmidt argues that the difference between pricing and
prohibiting is that the criminal law uses a social welfare function that gives no weight to
the criminal benefits expected by the defendant.
8 At the federal level, corporations are criminally liable for any act, committed by an
employee in the course of such person's employment that is intended to benefit the
corporation. This doctrine dates back to New York Central & Hudson River R.R. Co. v.
United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909). See also United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467
F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972); Commonwealth v. Beneficial Finance Co., 360 Mass. 188, 275
N.E.2d 33 (1971) (adopting broad theory of vicarious corporate criminal liability for acts
of an agent as a matter of common law). In contrast, under the Model Penal Code, it is
generally necessary for the prosecution to show that "the commission of the offense was
authorized, requested, commanded or performed by... a high managerial agent acting in
behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office or employment." See MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1964). For a discussion of how this
latter, more restrictive, doctrine of corporate criminal liability has been interpreted, see
Brickey, Rethinking Corporate Criminal Liability Under the Model Penal Code, 19
RUTGERS L.J. 593 (1988).
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of behavior that should be priced, rather than prohibited. This is because
society must make a judgment about the appropriate amount of behavior
(i.e., preventive monitoring) to demand and cannot take a simple all-or-noth-
ing position. Once it is conceded that some level of moniioring could be
excessive,9 then the cost to the corporation must be compared to the benefit
to society. Essentially, a pricing policy does this, focusing presumably on
the gravity of the social harm involved.
This observation does not deny that in other cases corporations might
have "intended" the crime (at least to the extent that senior officials
encouraged, tolerated, or ratified it). Nonetheless, the point remains that to
the extent that the role of corporate criminal liability is to encourage the
principal to monitor its agents, the criminal law is inevitably caught up in
the problem of pricing. To be sure, the law is not pricing the value of the
illegal benefit to the defendant, but rather the cost of preventing the crime to
the principal. Still, the analysis is much the same because private costs (i.e.,
monitoring expenditures) and public benefits (i.e., the deterrent benefits of
crime suppression) are subject to a trade-off.
The bottom line is that the criminal law seems to be expanding into a
variety of areas where it is infeasible or even irrational to ignore the costs of
law compliance. Yet, both Congress and state legislatures have shown little
interest in slowing this trend; nor is there much possibility that the Supreme
Court will place constitutional limits on crime definition (as Professor Hart
had hoped)."0 As a result, the only decisionmakers who can attempt in a
coherent way to determine when the criminal law should price and when it
should prohibit are those who make sentencing policy and judgments.
Uniquely, the sentencing stage affords a perspective from which nuances too
subtle or fact-specific to be defined in advance by legislation can be examined
retrospectively and in detail. In the case of the corporation, for example, it
becomes possible to consider whether the corporate defendant simply failed
to monitor a reckless agent adequately or whether it pressured its agents into
criminal misconduct.
The difference between pricing and prohibiting misbehavior involves
much more than the question of penalty levels. " Ultimately, the law's focus
should also shift. From a pricing perspective, the critical determination is
the setting of the penalty that brings public and private costs into balance.
I For example, if Corporation X spends $1 million annually on law compliance
programs, but still fails to detect an agent who commits a crime that is motivated by both
corporate and personal ends, its monitoring expenditures may well exceed the benefit
actually realized by society, and indeed should then be seen as an additional social cost.
'0 See Hart, supra note 1, at 431.
11 It should be underscored at the outset that the claim that some forms of
misconduct-particularly some forms of corporate misconduct-should be priced, not
prohibited, does not mean that penalty levels should be low. High prices are often
necessary to force a party to internalize the costs it imposes on others, particularly when
the risk of detection was low.
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However, from a prohibitory perspective, the central decision is the framing
of the legal standard. As Professor Cooter has shown, once expected penal-
ties are raised to a prohibitory level, individuals become extremely respon-
sive to changes in the legal standard, while under a pricing system,
individuals respond to the price, not the legal standard.' 2 Thus, this Article's
normative assertion that the criminal law should generally prohibit, not
price, requires one to specify carefully the legal terrain within which such a
policy is to be pursued. The mere fact that conduct is in violation of a
known and valid legal standard is insufficient, because sometimes society
may wish only to price such violations. The structure of this Article reflects
this concern; Part I essentially argues that the criminal law has been over-
extended precisely to the extent that it is being applied to behavior that soci-
ety must necessarily price. Ultimately, pricing is necessary on moral as well
as economic grounds when sufficiently clear partitions cannot be erected
between the unlawful behavior and closely related lawful behavior to justify
a prohibitory policy. Unfortunately, this condition holds true throughout
much of the "white collar" criminal context.
Other commentators have started at the same point as this Article, recog-
nizing that the criminal law is not simply a pricing system. Even among
"law and economics" scholars, several have recognized at least the plausibil-
ity of the position that the benefit to the defendant from criminal behavior
should be disallowed in public policy decisionmaking.'3 Yet, they have not
followed this idea through clearly as a map of the tort/crime distinction.
Correspondingly, our leading criminal law scholars-among them Henry
Hart, Sanford Kadish, and Herbert Packer-have periodically warned of the
danger of "overcriminalization": namely, excessive reliance on the criminal
sanction, particularly with respect to behavior that is not inherently morally
culpable. But one cannot meaningfully use the term "overcriminalization"
without first defining the boundaries within which the criminal sanction may
appropriately be used, and to answer this latter question only by saying that
the behavior must be "blameworthy" simply uses an adjective in lieu of a
theory.
The prior literature on "overcriminalization" has had a variety of specific
targets, depending largely on the particular development that troubled the
particular critic. Thus, Herbert Packer was principally concerned with "vic-
timless crimes;"' 4 Sanford Kadish, with the use of the criminal sanction to
12 Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523 (1984); see also infra notes
129-31 and accompanying text.
13 See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 7, at 12-13; Klevorik, Legal Theory and the Economic
Analysis of Torts and Crimes, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 905, 918 (1985) [hereinafter Klevorik,
Legal Theory]; Klevorick, On the Economic Theory of Crime, in NOMOS XXVII:
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 289 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1985); Shavell, Criminal Law
and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232,
1242 (1985).
14 See H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 249-364 (1968).
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enforce economic regulations; 15 and Henry Hart, with the increased ten-
dency of criminal statutes to impose strict liability or vicarious responsibil-
ity.16 In common, however, all three agreed that a basic "method"
distinguished the criminal law. As they saw it, the principal elements of this
method were advance legislative specification of the conduct proscribed,
strict construction of ambiguous terms, an emphasis on the defendant's state
of mind (or "mens rea"), and a close linkage between the criminal law and
behavior deemed morally culpable by the general community. They argued
that any substantial deviation from that "method" threatened the criminal
law's legitimacy. In truth, these standards had not always been faithfully
observed, but this Article will argue that the rate of the departures from
these norms seems plainly to have accelerated over the last decade.
Three trends, in particular, stand out. First, the federal law of "white
collar" crime now seems to be judge-made to an unprecedented degree, with
courts deciding on a case-by-case, retrospective basis whether conduct falls
within often vaguely defined legislative prohibitions.' Second, a trend is
evident toward the diminution of the mental element (or "mens rea") in
crime, particularly in many regulatory offenses.'" Third, although the crimi-
nal law has long compromised its adherence to the "method" of the criminal
law by also recognizing a special category of subcriminal offenses-often
called "public welfare offenses l--in which strict liability could be com-
bined with modest penalties, the last decade has witnessed the unraveling of
this uneasy compromise, because the traditional public welfare offenses-
now set forth in administrative regulations-have been upgraded to felony
status. This Article will refer to this last trend as the "technicalization" of
15 Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions To Enforce Economic
Regulations, 30 U. CHi. L. REV. 423 (1963).
16 Hart, supra note 1. Professor Hart argues that in the context of strict liability
offenses, "there can be no moral justification" for condemning and punishing one who is
blameless. Id. at 422.
1' The leading example of this trend is supplied by recently enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1346
(1988), which invites federal courts to consider any breach of a fiduciary duty or other
confidential relationship as a violation of the mail and wire fraud statutes. See infra notes
45-50 and accompanying text. This new legislative enactment is, however, simply a
continuation of a long-standing tradition of case-by-case judicial lawmaking under the
mail and wire fraud statutes. See infra notes 28-54 and accompanying text.
The recent evolution of insider trading law is also entirely judge-made, without any
legislative statement or administrative rule defining what constitutes insider trading. See,
e.g., Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); United States v.
Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y.
1990).
18 See infra notes 65-77 and accompanying text.
1' See Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 55 (1933) (citing the
sale of adulterated foods and violations of liquor and narcotic controls as examples of
public welfare offenses that create liability "without regard to the mind or intent of the
actor").
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crime and will combine departures from most of the above-described ele-
ments that characterize the criminal law's "method."
The upshot of these trends is that the criminal law seems much closer to
being used interchangeably with civil remedies. Sometimes, identically
phrased statutes are applicable to the same conduct-one authorizing civil
penalties, the other authorizing criminal sanctions.' More often, the crimi-
nal law is extended to reach behavior previously thought only civilly actiona-
ble. Either way, this practice of defining the criminal law to reach all civil
law violations in a particular field of law in order to gain additional deter-
rence may distort the underlying legal standard. What needs to be more
clearly recognized is the variety of ways in which such distortion can occur.
For example, some civil law standards may be aspirational in character (e.g.,
the rule that attorneys should avoid any "appearance of impropriety")."'
Other standards may frame prophylactic rules, which prevent the possibility
of misconduct, but involve no element of culpability.' Some recent writers
in the "law and economics" tradition have theorized that society may have a
particular "transaction structure" for dealing with different areas of social
behavior, sometimes using rules that would trigger only civil liability and at
other times using rules whose violation would be criminally prosecuted.23
Thus, overlaying the criminal law on the civil law may disrupt these transac-
tion structures. Still, provocative as this concept of "transaction structure"
is, it has remained an underdeveloped idea, which requires a fuller account
of why society should prefer the structure of the civil law over that of the
criminal law.
20 See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249-51 (1980) (permitting imposition
of civil penalty under environmental statute although the civil statute was virtually
identical in its wording to a longstanding criminal statute). Effectively, Ward implies
that the legislature can choose to characterize misconduct as either civil or criminal in
nature, or both-thereby giving enforcement officials the option of proceeding civilly or
criminally (or sometimes both).
21 Although there have been recent cases in which violations of ethical or fiduciary
standards have been successfully criminally prosecuted, see United States v. Bronston,
658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981), it is interesting to note that the American Law Institute's
recent Restatement, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (Tent. Draft
No. 2, 1990) concludes that "criminal sanctions are inappropriate as remedies for lawyer
conflict of interest." Id. at 85.
22 One such rule is § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(p)(b)
(1988), which requires corporate insiders to disgorge to their corporation profits realized
through short-swing trading in the corporation's securities. In order to eliminate the
temptations faced by corporate insiders, the statute does not require proof of either
possession of inside information or an intent to defraud. No criminal penalty is
authorized for violations of § 16(b), which is intended to be enforced strictly by private
civil suit.
23 See Klevorick, Legal Theory, supra note 13, at 907-08; Coleman, Crime, Kickers,
and Transaction Structures, in NOMOS XXVII: CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra.note 13, at
313.
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In overview, the two principal claims made by this Article exist in some
obvious tension. If true, the first claim-that the criminal law is more a
system of socialization than of pricing-makes the second predictable:
namely, that the criminal sanction is increasingly being used by regulators as
a preferred enforcement tool without regard to the traditional limitations on
its use. Almost by definition, a system for socialization will be put to new
uses, as authorities attempt to harness its educational power. Thus, the very
success of the criminal law as a socializing force implies the erosion of the
traditional point at which the tenuous crime/tort distinction had been main-
tained. Indeed, traditional libertarians-such as Hart, Kadish, and
Packer-have been criticized on this ground by sociologists, who have
argued that the social standards of blameworthiness necessarily evolve over
time along with other social attitudes.2 4 These critics have found the "over-
criminalization" thesis to be empty of content, because of its failure to recog-
nize the interactive, reciprocal relationship between the content of the
criminal law and the public's perception of what conduct is blameworthy.25
In their view, the public learns what is blameworthy in large part from what
is punished.
Undoubtedly, there is some merit in this argument. Obviously, new
problems may arise for which the criminal law is the most effective instru-
ment, but which involve behavior not historically considered blameworthy.
Modern technology, the growth of an information-based economy, and the
rise of the regulatory state make it increasingly difficult to maintain that only
the common law's traditional crimes merit the criminal sanction. In fact,
historically, the criminal law has never been static or frozen within a com-
mon law mold, but has constantly evolved.26 This has been especially true
within the field of "white collar" crime. Even the first modern "white col-
lar" offenses to be criminally prosecuted-price-fixing, tax fraud, securities
fraud, and, later, foreign bribery-were "regulatory" crimes in the sense that
they had not been traditionally considered blameworthy. In short, the line
between malum in se and malum prohibitum has been crossed many times
and largely discredited. Today, to rule out worker safety, toxic dumping, or
environmental pollution as necessarily beyond the scope of the criminal law
requires one to defend an antiquarian definition of blameworthiness.
But where does this leave us? Those following in the footsteps of Hart,
Kadish and Packer have a powerful rejoinder: if the criminal law is over-
24 See, e.g., Ball & Friedman, The Use of Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement of
Economic Legislation: A Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. REV. 197, 233 (1965) (approving
the perceived abandonment of "the search for general theories of crime and... criminal
sanctions," and proposing instead a search for "theories of human behavior").
25 See id.
26 Professor Michael Tigar has demonstrated that rapid changes in the English
economy coincided with rapid expansion in the English law of theft during the 18th
century. See Tigar, Symposium: A Critique of Rights: The Right of Property and the Law
of Theft, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1443 (1984).
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used, it will lose its distinctive stigma. While conceding that the criminal
law is a system of socialization, they would reply that for precisely that rea-
son it must be used parsimoniously. Once everything wrongful is made
criminal, society's ability to reserve special condemnation for some forms of
misconduct is either lost or simply reduced to a matter of prosecutorial dis-
cretion. Still, valid as this response is, it does not answer fully the criticism
that the traditional criminal law scholar's focus on blameworthiness is
anachronistic because it freezes the criminal law's necessary evolution, like a
fly in amber.
If so, what alternative is left? What substitute bulwark can prevent the
criminal law from sprawling over the landscape of the civil law? One answer
is to update the notion of blameworthiness, looking not only to historical
notions of culpability, but to well-established industry and professional stan-
dards whose violation has been associated with culpability within that nar-
rower community. Another answer is to focus on the temporal relationship
of the civil and criminal law. At some point, a civil standard can become so
deeply rooted and internalized within an industry or professional commu-
nity that its violation becomes blameworthy, even if it was not originally so.
Insider trading may supply such an example, where the norm has long since
become internalized within the industry. The relationship of the civil and
criminal law here is sequentially interactive: the civil law experiments with a
standard, but at some point it may "harden" into a community standard
that the criminal law can enforce. At that point, it may be appropriate to
prohibit, rather than price, at least if society believes that the defendant's
conduct lacks any colorable social utility.
But who makes these determinations? Ideally, the legislature should, but
there is little prospect that it will; nor is it properly positioned to compare
varying degrees of culpability. Thus, a "second best" answer is a sentencing
commission, which in drafting sentencing guidelines should attempt to sepa-
rate those instances when society should price from those when it should
prohibit. Only an administrative agency can both make such determinations
on a continuing and provisional basis and also attempt to determine the cor-
rect "price" when pricing is appropriate.
A roadmap of this Article is in order. Part I will advance this Article's
positive claim that the line between the civil and criminal law has blurred.
Part II will consider the rationales for separating the civil and criminal law,
and Part III will address the implementation of a means for preserving the
tort/crime distinction.
I. THE BLURRING OF THE BORDER
Three distinct subarguments will be made in this section. First, the crimi-
nal sanction has been applied broadly, and sometimes thoughtlessly, to a
broad range of essentially civil obligations, some of which were intended as
aspirational standards and others which are inherently open-ended and
evolving in character. Second, there has also been a retreat from the tradi-
1991]
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tional "method" of the criminal law, as the role of mens rea has been dimin-
ished and that of vicarious liability expanded. Third, a transition is evident
in the characteristic "white collar" prosecution. Prosecutions increasingly
tend to be less for violations of a statutory standard than for failures to com-
ply with administrative regulations. Characteristically, these regulations
resemble what an earlier era called "public welfare offenses," but with two
differences: (1) substantial criminal sentences are authorized, and (2) the
sheer volume of regulations that are now potentially enforceable through
criminal prosecution means that the criminal sanction has penetrated much
further into everyday life.
A. Criminalizing the Civil Law
Short of a doctrinal treatise or a major empirical study, no article could
hope to demonstrate the degree to which the criminal law has encroached
upon formerly "civil" areas of the law." What can be done, however, is to
illustrate this trend by examining changes in some areas that had seemed
quintessentially civil in character. For example, few legal categories seem
inherently less "criminal" in character than the civil law applicable to fiduci-
ary duties or to the use of economic duress in negotiations. Yet, both areas
have, to an uncertain extent, been subjected to the reach of the criminal law.
This section will use these two areas as case studies to illustrate how overlay-
ing the criminal law on the civil law may distort the latter.
1. The Criminalization of Fiduciary Duties
The federal mail and wire fraud statutes supply the most obvious example
of the criminal law being overlaid on civil law standards. By the mid- 1960s,
federal courts had accepted the principle that the term "scheme to defraud"
(which is the critical element in both the mail and wire fraud statutes)
required neither that there be any pecuniary or property loss to the victim
nor that the purpose of the scheme be contrary to state or federal law.
Rather, it was sufficient that a victim was defrauded of an "intangible right,"
such as the duty of public officials to provide "honest and faithful" serv-
ices." The contours of this "intangible right" theory have always been
27 What can be measured, however, is the increased use of the criminal sanction at the
federal level as a mechanism for regulating business behavior. White collar criminal
prosecutions rose from eight percent of the total number of federal criminal prosecutions
in 1970 to 24% in 1983.' See K. BRICKEY, CORPORATE AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME:
CASES AND MATERIALS XXV (1990).
28 For a review of the evolution of mail fraud as the preferred prosecutorial weapon in
these cases, see Coffee, From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalization of
Fiduciary Duties and the Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 117 (1981). The fiduciary breach theory is not the only way in which the mail fraud
statute has been expanded. At common law, an omission is fraudulent only when there is
a duty to speak (such as where a fiduciary relationship exists). But federal prosecutors
read the mail and wire fraud statutes to require disclosure of all material facts, even when
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uncertain, in part because'the governing standard was the ineffable principle
of "fair play."2 9 As several courts said in explaining the boundaries of the
intangible rights theory of mail fraud:
Law puts its imprimatur on ... accepted moral standards and con-
demns conduct which fails to match the reflection of moral uprightness,
of fundamental honesty, fair play and right dealing in the general and
business life of members of society.
0
Despite the fulsome prose in these decisions, their underlying facts usually
involved bribes or kickbacks, either to public officials or to purchasing
agents of private businesses. During the 1970s, however, prosecutors began
to exploit the latent potential in the "intangible rights" theory by prosecut-
ing cases that truly involved only a deprivation of such a claimed right. A
bizarre series of decisions followed. In United States v. Condolon,3 ' the Vic-
tims were young women, who had been deceived into providing sexual
favors for the defendant who had misrepresented his status as a talent scout.
In United States v. Lounderman,"2 the victims were defrauded of the intangi-
ble right to privacy when defendants tricked the telephone company into
revealing their addresses.
Still, the decisions that had the greatest impact were those that seemed to
criminalize any knowing failure to disclose a conflict of interest by a person
subject to a fiduciary duty. As late as 1976, the Second Circuit in a decision
by Judge Henry Friendly suggested that the "intangible rights" doctrine
applied only to public officials and not to private fiduciaries. 3 However, at
the beginning of the 1980s, the Second Circuit overrode his thoughtful dis-
tinction.' In United States v. Bronston,a it upheld the conviction of a law-
yer who secretly represented one client while his law firm represented a rival
contender for a public franchise. Bronston was a watershed decision,
no such duty exists. Thus, in one pending case, the senior executives of General
Development Corporation were indicted for failing to disclose to their potential
customers that their resort homes were overpriced in comparison to their competitors.
See United States v. Brown, Cr. 90-176-Cr. (S.D. Fla. 1990). Taken literally, this theory
exposes most salesmen to indictment, even without a material misrepresentation.
I Coffee, supra note 28, at 127.
30 Blachly v. United States, 380 F.2d 665, 671 (5th Cir. 1967), quoted in United States
v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534, 545 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976); see also United
States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir. 1973) (quoting Blachly). One of the first
decisions to use this fair play standard was Gregory v. United States, 253 F.2d 104, 109
(5th Cir. 1958).
31 600 F.2d 7 (4th Cir. 1979).
32 576 F.2d 1383, 1387 (9th Cir. 1978).
33 United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1399-1400 (2d Cir. 1976).
34 See United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
915 (1982); United States v. Barta, 635 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998
(1981).
35 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982).
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because no bribes or kickbacks were involved, and the evidence did not
demonstrate that the defendant had actually used his fiduciary position to
injure the firm's client. After Bronston, all that seemed necessary to support
a mail fraud conviction was a knowing and undisclosed breach of a fiduciary
standard. These decisions seemingly turned the mail and wire fraud statutes
into mandatory disclosure statutes that required all public officials and pri-
vate fiduciaries to disclose any conflict of interest to which they were
subject.s6
The highwater mark of this theory of liability came in the mid-1980s,
when federal prosecutors successfully used it to reach not only self-dealing
conduct by corporate officials against the interests of the corporation, but
also actions by corporate officials that were intended to benefit the firm, but
had not been adequately disclosed to the board or shareholders. In United
States v. Siegel 7 and United States v. Weiss, 8 corporate officers who created
off-book slush funds in order to facilitate questionable corporate payments
were convicted of fraud, even though they did not misappropriate any funds.
Indeed, in Weiss, the subordinate had acted pursuant to direct instructions
from his superiors to establish the secret fund. In a strong dissent in Siegel,
Judge Ralph Winter observed that this new construction redefined the crime
of fraud by judicial fiat: "In effect, a new crime-corporate improprieties-
which entails neither fraud nor even a victim, has been created." ' A long-
time professor of corporate law, Judge Winter understood the basic distinc-
tion between the duty of loyalty and the duty of care, which the rest of the
panel seems to have missed in Siegel and Weiss. In both cases, the defend-
ants may have violated their duty of care, but they did not engage in self-
dealing in any form. As a practical matter, they probably faced relatively
little prospect of civil liability, because the duty of care has historically not
been strictly enforced. The bottom line then is ironic: the criminal law has
been cantilevered out beyond the civil law as defendants have been convicted
of a federal felony on facts that would have been unlikely to support civil
liability in a derivative suit.
This line of cases came to a screeching, but temporary, halt in 1987 when
the Supreme Court decided, in McNally v. United States,4' that the mail
36 See, e.g., United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982) (upholding
conviction of defendant, a Republican Party chairman, for failing to disclose conflict of
interest resulting from commissions received by others from insurance policies), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983).
37 717 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1983). Despite several recent Supreme Court decisions limiting
the scope of the intangible rights theory, Siegel was recently cited by the Second Circuit
as authority for the proposition that a shareholder's "right to control" corporate officers
and to receive disclosure of wrongdoing was within the scope of the mail fraud statute.
See United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 463, 465 (2d Cir. 1991).
38 752 F.2d 777 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985).
39 Siegel, 717 F.2d at 24 (Winter, J., dissenting).
40 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
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fraud statute did not reach schemes to deprive victims of the intangible right
of honest services, but only schemes to obtain money or property. For a
time, McNally seemed a major obstacle to the continuing growth of a judge-
made law of white collar crime. Then, two things happened. First, the
Supreme Court announced in Carpenter v. United States4' that confidential
business information could amount to a form of intangible property. Under
this theory, it upheld Foster Winans's conviction for using data obtained
through his employment as a Wall Street Journal reporter to engage in
insider trading. Understandable as this result was, the theory adopted-i.e.,
that an employee may not use confidential business information acquired
during his employment-is extremely open-ended. For example, what hap-
pens when an employee changes firms? Arguably, his use of information
acquired while working for one employer for the benefit of a subsequent
employer might be said to deprive the former of confidential business infor-
mation. Yet, if this theory is carried even part way to the limits of its logic,
then the employee's mobility and, indeed, his own human capital would be
substantially restricted. The irony here is that the civil law had always
sought to disfavor constraints on employee mobility by declining to enforce
covenants not to compete, except to a very limited extent.'
Thus, Carpenter may illustrate an occasion on which the extension of the
criminal law into a previously civil law domain effects the policy underlying
substantive civil law. No longer do employers have only very limited power
to restrict their employee's mobility, because the employee's transfer of
information incident to a change of employment could trigger criminal lia-
bility or, more likely, a civil RICO action.43 More generally, Carpenter
threatened to trivialize McNally by allowing prosecutors simply to relabel
what they had indicted, before McNally, as a deprivation of an intangible
"right" as a deprivation of intangible "property." To a limited extent, this
has in fact happened."
41 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
42 See Coffee, HUSHI: The Criminal Status of Confidential Information After
McNally and Carpenter and the Enduring Problem of Overcriminalization, 26 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 121 (1988).
41 After Carpenter, RICO has been used to challenge the alleged misappropriation of
trade secrets and confidential business information by employees. See Delta Educ. Inc. v.
Langlois, 719 F. Supp. 42 (D.N.H. 1989); Rockwell Graphic Sys. Inc. v. DEV Indus.,
Inc., RICO Bus. Disp. Guide (CCH) 6581 (N.D. I11. Feb. 12, 1987).
44 The Fifth Circuit adopted a "constructive trust" theory under which the receipt of
kickbacks by employees cheated the employer out of its property right to the payments;
under common law the agent should have turned them over to the employer. See United
States v. Little, 889 F.2d 1367 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Matt, 838 F.2d 1356 (5th
Cir. 1988) (holding information to be a tangible property right); United States v,
Richerson, 833 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1987). In other circuits, a complicated jurisprudence
has developed over what interests rise to the level of a property right. In the Second
Circuit, the government's interest in awarding a license is viewed as merely regulatory in
character and not rising to the level of a property right. See United States v. Schwartz,
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The second post-McNally development was even more important: in 1988,
Congress enacted a statutory definition of the critical term, "scheme to
defraud. '45 New section 1346 defines this term to include any "scheme or
artifice to defraud another of the intangible right of honest services."' At a
stroke, this language may criminalize any violation of fiduciary duties or the
law of agency. The expansion of section 1346 then supplies a paradigm of
the criminal law being overlaid unthinkingly on top of the civil law, without
serious consideration being given to whether the civil law standard in ques-
tion should be backed by the special threat of the criminal law.
How have courts and prosecutors responded to this extension of the crimi-
nal law's scope? The early evidence is that they have read section 1346 even
more broadly than its language would seem to permit, reaching all cases that
were within the scope of the pre-McNally case law. In the recent RICO
prosecutions of commodities brokers on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
("CME"), the prosecutors charged the defendants under section 1346 with
breaching their duty to maintain the "honest functioning of the market-
place.",4' This view that section 1346 simply supplies a charter for continued
judicial lawmaking" ignores the counterargument that the statute's lan-
guage requires that its "intangible right of honest services" be tied down to
some definable common law or statutory right. Where do "rights to honest
services" come from? Are they discovered by federal judges based on princi-
ples of fair play? Or, must they already exist in the common law of the
924 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Evans, 844 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1988).
However, the Third Circuit has taken the opposite view. United States v. Martinez, 905
F.2d 709, 713-15 (3d Cir. 1989). One Second Circuit decision has found a "chose in
action" to rise to the level of a property right. See United States v. Porcelli, 865 F.2d
1352 (2d Cir. 1989). Recently, in United States v. Wallach, Docket No. 89-1544 (2d Cir.
May 31, 1991), the Second Circuit has revived the Weiss/Siegel line of cases, see cases
cited supra notes 37-39, and found that a shareholder's "right to control" constitutes a
property right within the scope of the mail fraud statute. In a broad statement that could
cover most nondisclosures, it said, "A shareholder's right to monitor and police the
behavior of the corporation and its officers is a property interest."
45 See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988). For a review of the legislative history, see United
States v. Berg, 710 F. Supp. 438 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), rev'd sub nom. United States v.
Schwartz, 924 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1991).
46 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988).
41 See United States v. Bailin, No. 89-668, n.14 (N.D. Ill., July 17, 1990). The
Government eventually amended the indictment to allege a scheme "to defraud the
investing public of its rights to the honest services of traders in the execution of orders in
the marketplace of the CME." Defendants challenged this revision as well on the
additional ground that floor brokers on the CME owed no fiduciary duty in the abstract
to the "investing public," but it was upheld.
41 See also United States v. Mosky, No. 89-669 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 1990) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file) (ruling that predicating a violation of section 1346 on the
deprivation of intangible rights does not violate the Constitution's ex post facto clause).
[Vol. 71:193
TORT/CRIME DISTINCTION
jurisdiction whose law applies to the transaction in question?49 To date, the
only federal courts to face these questions have preferred the expansive view
that section 1346 authorizes them to continue to "condemn conduct which
fails to match the reflection of moral uprightness, of fundamental honesty,
fair play and right dealing in the general and business life of members of
society."5 °
What is wrong with such an approach? As a matter of civil law, the short
answer is relatively little. Courts constantly create or discover new torts.
However, as a matter of criminal law, this approach should be unacceptable,
for several reasons. First, in traditional constitutional terms, it denies fair
notice, invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and violates the
separation of powers principle that has traditionally denied federal courts
the power to make common law crimes.5' However, in terms of this Arti-
cle's concerns, the vocabulary of constitutional law does not adequately
express the full dimensions of the problems inherent in broadly criminalizing
civil law standards. The basic problem is that tort law standards often dis-
play a soft-edged quality that is consistent with their evolutionary and often
aspirational character. For example, Cardozo wrote: "A trustee is held to
something stricter than the morals of the marketplace. Not honesty alone,
but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of
behavior." 52 And often this should be the standard expected of the fiduciary.
But, precisely because such a standard can neither be realized fully nor even
be defined with specificity in advance, it should not be criminalized. Aspira-
tional standards imply that there will be shortfalls in performance, and this
in turn means that to criminalize such a standard is to ignore the prudential
constraint that criminal laws should be capable of even and general
enforceability.
Civil standards are sometimes experimental, and on occasion courts
retreat from prior high-water marks. Within the corporate context, courts
in recent years have announced major new rules of fiduciary duty5" and have
4 Read as written, section 1346 requires that there be some duty of honest services,
which presumably would arise under some other body of law (state or federal). Courts,
however, appear to be reading it simply to reverse McNally and allow continued judicial
lawmaking. See cases cited infra notes 52-54.
50 Blachly v. United States, 380 F.2d 665, 671 (5th Cir. 1967).
51 For an overview of these themes, see Jeffries, Legality, Vagueness and the
Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189 (1985). See also Kolender v. Lawson,
461 U.S. 352 (1983).
52 Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 464, 453, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928). Cardozo's
phrasing, while lush, is not aberrant. California decisions have spoken of "a
comprehensive rule of 'inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and those
interested therein.'" Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 110, 460 P.2d 464,
472, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 600 (1969) (quoting Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini
Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 420, 241 P.2d 66, 75 (1952)).
13 See Singer v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype
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sometimes later retreated from these positions.' If one accepts the premise
that blameworthiness should be a prerequisite for the justified use of the
criminal sanction, it is difficult to reconcile this premise with the idea that
new and sometimes novel civil standards could carry criminal penalties. In
addition, criminalizing fiduciary duties might halt (or at least retard) this
process of lawmaking, as courts would predictably become more conserva-
tive in their willingness to announce new duties if they believed severe penal-
ties automatically followed from noncompliance.
The precision with which a legal standard speaks logically depends on the
purpose to which the standard will be put. Because the tort law is primarily
concerned with compensation and loss allocation, rather than outright deter-
rence, it has less need to give precise notice of where its strictures begin and
end. Phrased more generally, when society's objective is only to "price"
behavior, it may be fair to give only an approximate notice of where the
point is at which the actor will be asked to internalize the costs it imposes on
others. Thus, tort law rules often (and perhaps characteristically) are
expressed in fuzzy and indeterminate language (such as the "reasonable per-
son" standard) that does not give rise to "bright line" standards (as the crim-
inal law characteristically requires). Put simply, both tort standards and
many ethical rules do not mean to place a clear stop sign in front of the
actor, which says "go no further;" rather, they say that if you do go further,
your behavior may be costly to you because you must compensate those who
are injured by your conduct. In contrast, the criminal law threatens exem-
plary penalties and so must speak with greater precision. The difference is
between saying "Proceed at Your Own Risk" and "Halt."
2. The Hobbs Act'
Can it be criminal to breach a contract? On its face, the idea sounds
absurd. Holmes's famous statement that the obligation created by a contract
was to perform or pay damages seemed to recognize that the payment of
damages discharged the obligation." Proponents of the efficient breach the-
ory argue that it is desirable that contracts be breached when the breach will
create value." We need not enter this debate, but only note it to understand
Co., 367 Mass. 578, 593, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (1975); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d
494, 498-99, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 81 (1969).
54 The Delaware courts retreated from Singer in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d
701, 715 (Del. Super. Ct. 1983). Other courts have declined to follow New York's
decision in Diamond. See Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1978).
Massachusetts has also partially retreated from Donahue. See Wilkes v. Springside
Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976).
55 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988).
56 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897) ("The duty to
keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do
not keep it,-and nothing else.").
97 See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW § 4.8 (3d ed. 1986).
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the significance of this next development: under some recent decisions, a
breach of contract could be criminal.
To be sure, no decision has said this squarely, nor is one likely to, but
uncertainty already has been created. The source of this uncertainty is a
series of recent decisions that read the Hobbs Act to criminalize the extor-
tion of property from a person by placing that person in "fear of economic
loss."8 The Hobbs Act defines extortion as the "obtaining of property from
another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened
force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right."' The term "fear"
has recently been given an expansive judicial interpretation to include
actions or threats which place another in fear of economic loss.' This so-
called economic duress theory has not yet been pushed to the degree that the
"intangible rights" theory of mail fraud has, but this may mean only that we
are at an earlier moment in the evolution of still another new theory of white
collar crime.
Consider then the degree to which much of commercial life could be
reached by this theory. Suppose that in the construction industry, a subcon-
tractor is under a fixed-price contract to complete a phase of a skyscraper-
for example, the basic plumbing-without which further construction is
impossible. It has contracted to complete the job for $5,000,000, but it now
demands a price of $10,000,000, because it knows the general contractor
faces costly delays if it fails to perform. Not surprisingly, contract law pro-
vides a restitutionary remedy for the general contractor if it pays this added
amount under the circumstances."' But even if this behavior amounts to a
form of economic extortion, should it be deemed a felony under the Hobbs
Act? No case has yet clearly dealt with such a fact pattern, but the theory of
fear of economic loss covers this case just as much as the more common case
of the labor leader who, unless given a payoff, will call a strike.
Why should the criminal law not reach such a fact pattern? One reason
may be that it is very hard to differentiate the case in which the subcontrac-
tor is seeking to extort from the case in which it has truly encountered force
majeure or other unexpected difficulties, the cost of which it is entitled to
pass on to the general contractor. Too much depends on subjective motiva-
tions, because the defendant's actions are equivocal-that is, they could be
consistent with either criminality or innocuous behavior. When equivocal
conduct is criminalized, defendants may effectively be punished more for
their intentions than for their conduct. A second reason may be that con-
tractual breaches, even of this special kind, are endemic and would arguably
51 See United States v. Kattar, 840 F.2d 118, 124 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v.
Covino, 837 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1988).
59 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2).
60 Kattar, 840 F.2d at 124; Covino, 837 F.2d at 68.
61 See Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 29 N.Y.2d 124, 131-33, 272 N.E.2d 533,
536-37, 324 N.Y.S.2d 22, 26-29 (1971).
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overload the criminal justice system. 2 Again, criminalization would violate
the prudential side constraint that the use of the criminal sanction is appro-
priate only when the norm can be evenly and generally enforced. A third
reason is that civil remedies are more likely to be adequate in this context
because there is less risk of nondetection.6" Ultimately, however, there may
be an overshadowing reason for declining to criminalize: the behavior in
question-i.e., use of economic duress-may have social utility. If so, soci-
ety should price, rather than prohibit, the behavior in question (through
means such as punitive damages).
Some courts have tried to place limits on this economic duress theory of
extortion,6 but these limits do not address the real problem-namely, that
sometimes it is legitimate to use economic threats. To determine when it is
and when it is not, a court must engage in a retrospective factual evaluation
and delicate line drawing, both of which exist in uneasy tension at best with
the ideal of fair notice. Once again, the development of this "fear of eco-
nomic loss" theory of extortion illustrates an idea being expanded to the
limits of its logic-and beyond. Again, the piecemeal development of an
idea in the classic case-by-case method of the common law proves inappro-
priate for the criminal law because it creates great uncertainty, leaving few
bright lines that individuals may approach safely.
B. The Diminution of Mens Rea
American criminal law scholarship has always placed the issue of mens
rea at center stage. Its greatest achievement-the Model Penal Code-cre-
ates a presumption that mens rea applies to every material element in the
crime, unless the statute clearly indicates otherwise.6 5 In Morissette v.
United States,' the Supreme Court seemed to give such a presumption a
quasi-constitutional gloss:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when
inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as uni-
versal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the
human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual
to choose between good and evil. A relation between some mental ele-
62 Of course, the counterargument is that, after criminalization, the rate of such
defaults would decline.
63 The victims of economic extortion know that they have been injured and typically
have access to the legal system; in contrast, a crime such as insider trading has a low
probability of detection and, arguably, many scattered victims who cannot take collective
action.
6 See United States v. Garcia, 907 F.2d 380, 382 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v.
Capo, 817 F.2d 947, 951 (2d Cir. 1987).
65 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (Official Draft 1962).
66 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
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ment and punishment for a harmful act is almost as instinctive as the
child's familiar exculpatory 'But I didn't mean to'. ... 67
More recently, in Liparota v. United States,68 the Court reaffirmed this pre-
sumption, at least with respect to those elements in the crime that establish
moral blameworthiness.69 Simultaneously, however, Liparota acknowledged
that an exception to this generalization existed for "public welfare offenses."
Reviewing its prior decisions on mens rea, the Court explained that in those
cases in which it had upheld the omission of a mental element, the statute
"rendered criminal a type of conduct that a reasonable person should know
is subject to stringent public regulation and may seriously threaten the com-
munity's health or safety.",70
This language frames a central question: what is the scope of this excep-
tion for public welfare offenses? Lower courts have read the Liparota excep-
tion as limited to cases in which the risks created by the defendants' conduct
"may be presumed to be regulated because of their inherent danger.",71 As
an example, the Liparota Court cited United States v. Freed,72 a case in
which the Court upheld a conviction for illegal possession of unregistered
hand grenades, notwithstanding the defendant's claim (and the trial court's
failure to instruct the jury) that he could be convicted only if he had knowl-
edge that the hand grenades were unregistered.73 Both Liparota and Freed
thus involved defendants who claimed lack of knowledge of the applicable
regulations; but Liparota won, and Freed lost. Seemingly, the obvious pub-
lic safety factor present in Freed was not present in Liparota, which involved
only the unauthorized use of food stamps and not a deadly weapon.
If public safety is the deciding test, the possibility arises that many envi-
ronmental statutes, which commonly require permits before various conduct
(e.g., the disposal of waste, the filling-in of wetlands, etc.) may be engaged in,
will fall on the strict liability side of the line. Here, the circuit courts of
67 Id. at 250-51.
68 471 U.S. 419 (1985) (requiring government to show that defendant knew that he
acquired or used food stamps in a manner not authorized by statute or regulations).
69 In United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63 (1984), the Court held that mens rea need
not be proven with respect to a jurisdictional element. Yermian may give rise to a
labelling game as to what elements in a statute are merely jurisdictional, but the
subsequent decision in Liparota shows that the Court remains loyal to the principles of
Morissette.
70 471 U.S. at 433.
71 United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
72 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
11 In Freed, the statute made it a crime "to receive or possess a firearm which is not
registered [to] him." 401 U.S. at 604 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (Supp. V 1964)).
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appeal have recently divided.74 In United States v. Hoflin, 5 the defendant
was convicted of aiding and abetting the illegal disposal of hazardous waste
in violation of the Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA).76 What
had the defendant done? While Director of Public Works for the town of
Ocean Shores, Washington, he had authorized the disposal of leftover road
paint by burial on property adjoining the town's sewage treatment plant.
After testing, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") determined
that the paint fell within the class of hazardous waste for which the EPA
requires a disposal permit. Hoflin's defense was that he did not know the
town lacked such a permit and that, therefore, the trial judge was required to
instruct the jury that to convict Hoflin it had to find that he knew either that
the town lacked the requisite permit or was acting in violation of one.
Rejecting this claim, the Ninth Circuit found that the statute need not be
read to require knowledge of the lack of a permit.77
"I Compare United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984) with
United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989) and United States v. Neville
Chemical Co., 888 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1989). For a similar division as to whether the
defendant must realize that the waste was hazardous, compare United States v. Sellers,
926 F.2d 410, 414-16 (4th Cir. 1991) (jury need not be charged to find that defendant
knew waste was hazardous) with United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 745-46 (4th Cir.
1990) (contra).
75 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990).
76 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1988). The criminal provision at issue in Hoflin was section
6928(d), which provides for criminal penalties for disposal of hazardous wastes without
an EPA permit or in knowing violation of an existing permit. See infra note 77.
7 Section 6928(d) provides:
Any person who -
(2) knowingly treats, stores or disposes of any hazardous waste identified or listed
under subchapter either -
(A) without having obtained a permit under Section 6925 of this title...; or
(B) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of such
permit;
shall, upon conviction, be subject to [fines, imprisonment, or both] (emphasis
added).
The statutory anomaly in § 6928(d) is that it uses the mens rea term "knowing" or
"knowingly" twice. This could be read, as the Hoflin court found, to mean that no mens
rea requirement existed with regard to the failure to obtain a permit under
§ 6928(d)(2)(A). Alternatively, the statute could be read, as in Liparota, to use the first
reference to "knowingly" to modify all subsequent elements of the crime. In United
States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), the Third Circuit adopted
this latter reading, even before Liparota. While there is a statutory basis for the result in
Hoflin, the decision in Sellers that the jury need not find that the defendant knew the
waste to be hazardous in order to convict seems considerably more extreme, but sympto-
matic. Sellers specifically requested a jury charge "that the defendant knew or reasonably
should have known that the substance was waste and that the waste could be harmful to
persons or the environment if ... improperly disposed of." 926 F.2d at 415. Yet, the
Fifth Circuit, citing Freed, ruled that once the defendant knew what the disposed mate-
rial was, he was "imputed with the knowledge that it may be regulated by public health
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On a policy level, such a decision can be defended if one reads the burial
of excess paint in Hoflin to be conduct equivalent to the possession of hand
grenades in Freed. Yet, common sense tells us that the average citizen
knows hand grenades are dangerous (and therefore presumptively regu-
lated), but has no similar reaction to disposing of ordinary paint, which the
average person has encountered and used much of his or her life. Burying
paint becomes "hazardous" only once we apply that label to it, not from
ordinary human experience. In short, the presumption that danger-invites-
regulation is reasonable in one case, but not in the other.
Ultimately, the only factor truly suggesting "blameworthy" conduct on
the defendant's part was the knowledge (or lack thereof) that an EPA permit
was lacking. Thus, the mental element that the Hoflin court read out of the
statute was the lone connection between "blameworthiness" and the crimi-
nal sanction. In contrast, a defendant in possession of a quantity of hand
grenades is at least presumptively involved in "blameworthy" conduct sim-
ply based on possession. The line between Freed and Liparota then is not
simply the presence or absence of a threat to the public safety, but the exist-
ence of factors corroborating blameworthiness in one and their absence in
the other. Part II will return to the significance of this linkage between some
minimal element of blameworthy conduct and the use of criminal sanctions,
but the immediate point is that because many regulatory statutes involve
conduct creating some threat to the public safety, a theory may be on the
verge of judicial acceptance that effectively severs this linkage between
blameworthiness and criminal punishment.
C. Vicarious Responsibility
Generally, in American criminal law, individuals are criminally liable
only for conduct that: (1) they direct or participate in; (2) they otherwise aid
or abet; or (3) with respect to which they conspire. Corporate officers, how-
ever, now appear to face an additional form of vicarious liability. In United
States v. Park,78 the Supreme Court upheld the imposition of criminal liabil-
ity upon "corporate employees who have 'a responsible share in the further-
ance of the transaction,' 9 even when the corporate officer took action to
prevent the violation."0 Lower federal courts have extended this principle to
legislation." Id. at 416. In contrast, even in Hoflin, the jury was properly charged that
the defendant must know "that the chemical wastes had the potential to be harmful to
others or the environment." Id.
78 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
79 Id. at 670.
80 Id. at 663-64. Defendant Park was the chief executive officer of a supermarket
chain having 36,000 employees and 874 retail outlets. Rodent contamination was found
in its Baltimore warehouse, thereby violating the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
21 U.S.C. § 331(k). Park had received a prior notice from the FDA that contamination
had been found, instructed his vice president for legal affairs to investigate, and later was
informed him that the Baltimore division vice president was "taking corrective action."
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apply, even when it has appeared that subordinate employees had purposely
failed to follow the superior's orders"' or that the officer took significant cor-
rective action that could not be implemented in time because of a labor
strike.82
Park's "responsible share" theory was announced in the context of a strict
liability statute, whose uncompromising harshness the Court actually
relaxed marginally by recognizing an "objective impossibility" defense.8 3
Both legislation and subsequent decisions seem to be extending Park's stan-
dard of vicarious liability both to other "public welfare" statutes and, more
questionably, to statutes requiring higher mens rea levels." This expansion
of the Park doctrine has particular significance in light of new and proposed
"reckless endangerment" statutes. Under one environmental statute, a
defendant can receive fifteen years in prison for "knowing endangerment"
that creates a risk of "serious bodily injury." 85 Although the mens rea level
here of "knowing" is certainly adequate to satisfy traditional civil libertarian
concerns, Park's "responsible share" concept broadens the scope of potential
Park, 421 U.S. at 664; see also State v. Kailua Auto Wreckers, Inc., 62 Haw. 222, 615
P.2d 730 (1980).
81 See, e.g., United States v. Starr, 535 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1976).
82 See United States v. Y. Hata & Co., 535 F.2d 508 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
828 (1976).
83 421 U.S. at 673.
14 Originally, the responsible corporate officer doctrine was limited to strict liability
offenses. See Zarky, The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA)
983, 989-90 (Jan. 9, 1991); Comment, Limits on Individual Accountability for Corporate
Crime, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 604, 618 n.85 (1985). In several recent criminal cases,
however, courts have charged the jury that they may convict responsible corporate
officers, seemingly on a strict liability basis, even where the statute expressly required a
knowing, reckless or negligent level of mens rea. See Zarky, supra, at 989-90.
Also, the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251, et seq., codifies the "responsible officer
doctrine" by defining the term "person" to include "any responsible corporate officer."
33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6). The Clean Air Act contains a similar provision. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7413(c)(3). Under both statutes, however, discharges are rendered unlawful only if the
defendant acted "negligently" or "knowingly." See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1). Properly
construed, this means that corporate officers can be convicted for their corporation's
violations, but only if they have the requisite mens rea. See United States v. Cattle King
Packing Co., 793 F.2d 232, 240-41 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 985 (1986).
Nonetheless, courts have repeatedly given a responsible corporate officer charge without
charging the jury as to the defendant's necessary state of mind. See Zarky, supra, at 989-
93 (discussing unreported cases). For other recent cases, see United States v. Frezzo
Bros., 602 F.2d 1123, 1130 n.11 (3d Cir. 1979) (extending vicarious liability to the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act); United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526
F.2d 1293, 1300 n.19 (5th Cir. 1976); State v. Kailua Auto Wreckers, Inc., 62 Haw. 222,
615 P.2d 730 (1980). Park has also been followed with respect to the assessment of civil
penalties against corporate officers. See United States v. Hodges X-Ray, Inc., 759 F.2d
557 (6th Cir. 1985).
85 See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) (1988).
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defendants so as arguably to make anyone within the corporate hierarchy
with power to correct or mitigate the risk liable if they have knowledge of it.
Is, for example, a vice president for public relations liable where he or she
has knowledge and might conceivably have influenced the chief executive
officer to change a practice? Similar liability is possible under an OSHA
statute that forbids employers willfully to violate a mandated health or
safety standard that causes the death of a worker.' Although the statutory
focus is on the employer, Park could be read to expand the class of persons
liable so as to reach all "responsible" managers within the firm. 7
In 1990, California actually enacted such a broadly inclusive statute."
Under it, both the corporation and any "manager with respect to a product,
facility, equipment, process, place of employment or business practice" is
criminally liable if the manager has constructive knowledge of "a serious
concealed danger" and fails to warn the appropriate regulatory agency and
affected employees within fifteen days.89 The California statute thus com-
bines a negligence level of mens rea with Park's broadened responsibility and
then imposes liability essentially for an omission: failing to report the dan-
ger and warn employees within an abbreviated time period. Such breadth
may shock traditional civil libertarians, but it could be the wave of the
future.
D. The "Technicalization" of Crime
Regulatory violations that involve no mental element and pose strict lia-
bility have long been known to the criminal law. Nearly sixty years ago,
86 See 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (1988). At present, the OSHA statute authorizes a
maximum sentence of only six months imprisonment for a first offender and thus
arguably qualifies as a public welfare offense. However, under a pending Senate bill, this
statute would be expanded to reach any willful violation causing "serious bodily injury."
Also, the penalty would be increased from six months to five years (for a first offense) and
ten years (for a second). See Pickholtz, The Increasing Criminalization of Business
Conduct: An Overview, 11 Bus. LAW. UPDATE, Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 8-9.
s In United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 664-65 (3d Cir. 1984),
the Third Circuit said that necessary knowledge of an element of a crime could be
inferred from proof that a defendant employee had a "responsible position with the
corporate defendant." Id. This notion of vicarious knowledge seems to derive from Park.
88 See California Corporate Criminal Liability Act of 1989 (adding § 387 to the
California Penal Code).
89 Id. Under § 387(a)(1), the defendant must have "actual knowledge" of the
"concealed danger." However, § 387(b)(3) then defines "actual knowledge" to include
possession of "information that would convince a reasonable person in the circumstances
in which the manager is situated that the serious concealed danger exists." Section
387(b)(1) defines "manager" as broadly as did Park by including all persons possessing
"management authority in . . . [the] business" and "significant responsibility for any
aspect of a business which includes actual authority for the safety of a product or business
practice or for the conduct of research or testing in connection with a product or business
practice."
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Professor Francis Sayre catalogued the occasions qn which legislatures and
courts had dispensed with mens rea, naming this special class of criminal
prosecutions "public welfare offenses."'  Tracing the history of such
offenses back before the Civil War in the United States and even earlier in
England, he found their common denominator to be an attempt to protect
the public health and safety by attaching light penalties (usually small fines)
to police regulations.9 ' Typically, the offenses so criminalized involved the
sale of adulterated food or alcohol and narcotics violations where mere pos-
session was deemed sufficient to establish liability.92 Although Sayre
approved of the creation of such a special category of offenses involving no
showing of personal culpability, he was emphatic that the doctrine neither
should be extended to "true crimes" nor should justify more than de mini-
mus levels of punishment, because "[t]o do so would sap the vitality of the
criminal law."
9 3
Since the mid-1980s, American law has experienced a little noticed explo-
sion in the use of public welfare offenses. By one estimate, there are over
300,000 federal regulations that may be enforced criminally. 4 Over the last
three years, the federal government has prosecuted more than 400 cases
involving environmental crimes, resulting in cumulative prison sentences of
nearly 300 years.9' The total fines annually imposed in environmental crime
cases rose from $3.6 million in 1987 to over $12 million in 1989.96 With the
advent of sentencing guidelines, prison terms for environmental crime have
become both more likely and longer, with the presumptive benchmark for a
I Sayre, supra note 19.
91 Sayre finds the earliest American decisions upholding such offenses to be Barnes v.
State, 19 Conn. 397 (1849) and Commonwealth v. Boynton, 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 160
(1861).
92 Even at the time Sayre wrote, he noted that in a few cases public welfare offenses
had been prosecuted as felonies, but he disapproved of such prosecutions. Sayre, supra
note 19, at 72; see State v. Lindberg, 125 Wash. 51, 59, 215 P. 41, 45 (1923).
93 Sayre, supra note 19, at 84.
This estimate was made by Stanley Arkin, a well-known practitioner in the field of
white collar crime, at the George Mason Conference in October 1990 which produced
this Symposium. See Leary, The Commission's New Option That Favors Judicial
Discretion in Corporate Sentencing, 3 Fed. Sentencing Rep. 142, 144 n. 10 (1990).
5 See Schmidt, Company on Trial for Injuries on Job, N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1990, at
AI0, col. 4. Statistics vary, but the pattern is clear. According to another recent survey,
the number of persons jailed for federal environmental crimes was 90 over the last five
years. However, the number of such indictments rose from 40 in 1983 to 134 in 1990.
See Gold, Increasingly, Prison Term is the Price for Polluters, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1991,
at B6, col. 3.
96 See Arkin, Crime Against the Environment, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 9, 1990, at 3, col. 1.
(citing Environmental Protection Agency, 4 OFFICE OF CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT
BULLETIN 3 (Mar. 1990)). The EPA data also show a 130% increase over the last four
years in federal environmental criminal cases initiated. Id.
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felony conviction now estimated at two years in prison.' Indeed, as Stanley
Arkin, one of the most experienced defense counsel in this area, has
observed: "Remarkably, the environmental guidelines almost always call for
a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum, thereby forcing a court to sen-
tence the offender to the maximum penalty prescribed by the relevant
statute.
98
Obviously, environmental crime is important, and knowing violations-
such as falsification of records or willful endangerment-are serious offenses
that do not merit leniency. But, the typical environmental offense involves
the mishandling of toxic substances, and recent decisions have reduced or
eliminated the role of mens rea in these statutes, while also applying Park's
doctrine that corporate officers who have a "responsible relation" to the per-
formance of the statutory obligations are liable under them.9 As a result,
the traditional public welfare offense has now been coupled with felony level
penalties. While the defendant in Park was only fined, corporate executives
in an equivalent position in the future may face years in prison.
This process is only beginning. Although the Environmental Protection
Agency has been notably aggressive in referring violations for criminal pros-
ecution, other agencies with similar statutory authority have been much less
ready to make criminal referrals."° In time, these more hesitant agencies
seem likely to respond to public pressure and follow the EPA's lead.
Recently, the SEC has begun to make criminal referrals in stock parking
cases, which at bottom involve record-keeping and reporting violations hav-
ing little, if any, relationship to the public health or safety.1 ' Exxon has
91 For this estimate from Kevin A. Gaynor, a Washington attorney specializing in the
field, see Stipp, Toxic Turpitude: Environmental Crime Can Land Executives in Prison
These Days, Wall St. J., Sept. 10, 1990, at 1, col. 1. While not all (or probably even most)
sentences for environmental crimes are received by corporate executives, one survey
shows that corporate officers were sentenced to 39 years' imprisonment (and almost $7
million in fines) in environmental cases in 1988. See Seymour, Civil and Criminal
Liability of Corporate Officers Under Federal Environmental Laws, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA)
337 (June 9, 1989).
98 Arkin, supra note 96, at 23.
1 See supra notes 78-87.
100 OSHA has referred only 42 cases for criminal prosecution in its 18 year existence.
Of these 14 were prosecuted, and only one resulted in a prison sentence (of 45 days). See
Schmidt, supra note 95.
1O See United States v. Regan, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,481 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(prosecution of Princeton Newport partners), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 937 F.2d 823
(2d Cir. 1991). The conviction for conspiracy to commit securities fraud was upheld,
while the convictions on the tax counts were reversed. "Stock parking" can be
prosecuted as a violation of either the SEC's bookkeeping rules, its margin rules, or, if the
acquisition exceeds five percent of a class of equity securities, its rules under the Williams
Act. The definition of what constitutes "stock parking" has evolved rapidly in recent
years. See Coffee, Developing Law on Stock Parking, Bidder Disclosure, N.Y.L.J., Sept.
11, 1989, at 39, col. 5.
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been indicted in connection with the Valdez oil spill for entrusting control of
a vessel to a person that it allegedly knew or should have known to have
been an alcoholic. 2 Finally, the recent indictment of Eastern Airlines and
several of its employees for failure to follow correct maintenance and safety
procedures, as required by Federal Aviation Administration regulations,
opens a vast horizon of potential criminal prosecutions.0" As with stock
parking prosecutions, the actual behavior involves falsification of the com-
pany's own business records. At this point, there are few, if any, federal
regulations that could not potentially support a federal criminal prosecution
under one theory or another.104
In fairness, the federal government's attempt to use criminal sanctions in
traditionally civil areas-such as stock parking-has met with some judicial
resistance. During the last year, the Second Circuit has reversed several
securities fraud convictions in marginal cases, but affirmed others where the
evidence of intent was clearer. 0 5 Still, these decisions lack any clear ration-
102 See United States v. Exxon Corp., No. A90-015 (D. Alaska Apr. 9, 1990) (charging
violations of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 411, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act,
16 U.S.C. §§ 703, 707(a), the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(1 1),
and the Dangerous Cargo Act, 46 U.S.C. § 3718(b)). Most of these offenses can be
characterized as "public welfare offenses."
103 Eastern Airlines and nine of its managers were indicted on July 25, 1990 by a
federal grand jury in Brooklyn for allegedly routinely ignoring airplane repairs and
maintenance and falsifying reports to the Federal Aviation Administration to make it
appear that the work was done properly. See Weiner, Eastern Airlines Indicted In
Scheme over Maintenance, N.Y. Times, July 29, 1990, at AI, col. 6. Among the alleged
violations were a failure to drain water from fuel tanks, installation of defective cockpit
gauges, and improper maintenance of landing gear, radar and automatic pilots. Id.
While filing false reports with a federal agency has long been a felony under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001 and thus presents no new conceptual issue, an indictment for failure to perform
required maintenance does represent a new departure in the continuing criminalization of
-civil norms. As a precedent in terms of prosecutorial behavior, it opens up the prospect
that other failures to comply with due care or ministerial standards will be treated as
felonies.
1o Under 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976), any conspiracy to "defraud the United States" is a
felony. This language has been read to cover any conspiracy intended to frustrate the
lawful operation of government or impede the functioning of a federal agency, such as by
violating an administrative rule, even though the rule violated was not itself enforced by
criminal penalties. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 172 (1966); see also
Goldstein, Conspiracy To Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405 (1959). Hence,
virtually any federal administrative regulation can potentially be criminally enforced
under this theory.
105 During 1991, the Second Circuit reversed the "stock parking" convictions of John
Mulheren, James Sherwin (vice chairman of GAF Corporation), and GAF Corporation,
but it affirmed the securities fraud convictions of Paul Bilzerian and the Princeton
Newport partners (while in the last case reversing the tax fraud convictions of the
Princeton Newport partners). See United States v. GAF Corp., 928 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir.
1991); United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Regan,
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ale and tend to depend on specific ad hoc judicial theories that seem in some
cases driven by a need to justify reversal on as narrow a ground as possible.
Conceivably, the phenomenon of judicial nullification is at work in some of
these cases, but such a process is at best an inconsistent, sometime thing.
E. An Initial Summary: The Uncertain Cost/Benefit Calculus
Public concern about a newly perceived social problem-the environment,
worker safety, child neglect, etc.-seems to trigger a recurring social
response: namely, an almost reflexive resort to criminal prosecution, either
through the enactment of new legislation or the use of old standby theories
that have great elasticity. Increasingly, criminal liability may be imposed
based only on negligence or even on a strict liability basis. The premise
appears to be that if a problem is important enough, the partial elimination
of mens rea and the use of vicarious responsibility are justified."° No doubt,
the criminal sanction does provide additional deterrence, but what are the
costs of resorting to strict liability and vicarious responsibility as instruments
of social control? This will be a theme of Part II, but one aspect of this
problem deserves special mention in view of the apparent escalation of pub-
lic welfare offenses into felonies.
If the disposal of toxic wastes, securities fraud, the filling-in of wetlands,
the failure to conduct aircraft maintenance, and the causing of workplace
injuries become crimes that can be regularly indicted on the basis of negli-
gence or less, society as a whole may be made safer, but a substantial popula-
tion of the American workforce (both at white collar and blue collar levels)
becomes potentially entangled with the criminal law. Today, most individu-
als can plan their affairs so as to avoid any realistic risk of coming within a
zone where criminal sanctions might apply to their conduct. Few individu-
als have reason to fear prosecution for murder, robbery, rape, extortion or
any of the other traditional common law crimes. Even the more contempo-
rary, white collar crimes-price fixing, bribery, insider trading, etc.---can be
easily avoided by those who wish to minimize their risk of criminal liability.
At most, these statutes pose problems for individuals who wish to approach
the line but who find that no bright line exists. In contrast, modern indus-
trial society inevitably creates toxic wastes that must be disposed of by some-
one. Similarly, workplace injuries are, to a degree, inevitable. As a result,
some individuals must engage in legitimate professional activities that are
937 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Mulheren, No. 90-1691 (2d Cir. July 10,
1991) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Usapp file). I have discussed these decisions in more
detail elsewhere. See Coffee, The Meaning of Mulheren, N.Y.L.J., July 25, 1991, at 5.
io No limit appears to exist on the crimes for which a strict liability solution strike
some as justified. For the recently expressed view that the problem of science fraud has
become a major national problem and therefore may justify a strict liability statute which
would hold laboratory supervisors liable for fraud committed by subordinates, see
O'Reilly, More Gold and More Fleece: Improving the Legal Sanctions Against Medical
Research Fraud, 42 ADMIN. L. REV. 393 (1990).
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regulated by criminal sanctions; to this extent, they become unavoidably
"entangled" with the criminal law. That is, they cannot plan their affairs so
as to be free from the risk that a retrospective evaluation of their conduct,
often under the uncertain standard of negligence, will find that they fell
short of the legally mandated standard. Ultimately, if the new trend toward
greater use of public welfare offenses continues, it will mean a more perva-
sive use of the criminal sanction, a use that intrudes further into the main-
stream of American life and into the everyday life of its citizens than has
ever been attempted before.
Several replies are predictable to this claim that there is a social loss in
defining the criminal law so that individuals cannot safely avoid its applica-
tion. Liberals may claim that the traditionally limited use of the criminal
sanction was class-biased and that a more pervasive use of it simply corrects
that imbalance. Economists may argue that the affected individuals will
only demand a "risk premium" in the labor market and, having received
one, cannot later complain when the risk for which they were compensated
arises. 107 Others may conclude that the anxiety imposed on such employees,
while regrettable, is necessary, because it is small in comparison to the lives
saved, injuries averted, and other social benefits realized from generating
greater deterrence. This may be true, but the cost/benefit calculus is a com-
plex and indeterminate one that depends upon a comparison of marginal
gain (in terms of injuries averted) in comparison to other law enforcement
strategies (such as greater use of corporate liability or civil penalties) that
have not yet been utilized fully. Moreover, on the cost side of the ledger, one
must consider not simply the' consequences to those actually prosecuted, but
the anxiety created within the potential class of criminal defendants. To the
extent that liability is imposed for omissions (i.e., failure to detect and cor-
rect dangerous conditions), such fear will affect a broad class of employees,
most of whom will never be prosecuted or even threatened with prosecution.
In addition, there is a cost to civil libertarian values, because statutes that
apply broadly can never be enforced evenly. Hence, some instances of
"targeting" or selective prosecutions (based on whatever criteria influence
the individual prosecutor) become predictable. These costs would be more
tolerable if the conduct involved were inherently blameworthy, but negli-
gence, like death and taxes, is inevitable.
Ultimately, much depends on how we define the purposes of the criminal
law. If its purpose is simply to prevent crime, the costs of the broad use of
the criminal sanction against corporate managers to deter pollution, negli-
gence-caused injuries, or other social harms may be justified. But if we
107 This argument depends on whether ex ante compensation is always adequate to
compensate for ex post injuries. Robert Nozick makes an argument that even full
compensation for injury is not adequate when it creates fear within a broader class than
those actually injured. See infra note 115 and accompanying text. This analogy seems to
fit closely the problem of threatening thousands of executives with criminal liability for
negligence but actually prosecuting only a few.
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define the criminal law's purposes more broadly-for example, as to "liber-
ate" society from fear, or to enable the realization of human potential' 0 8-
these broader goals may be seriously compromised by a pervasive use of the
criminal sanction against individuals who cannot escape its potential threat.
Pursued single-mindedly, a purely negative definition of the criminal law's
purposes that asserts that the criminal law's only goal is the prevention of
crime ultimately ends up, as Herbert Packer wrote, "creating an environ-
ment in which all are safe but none is free."' 0 9
II. THE RATIONALE FOR THE TORT/CRIME DISTINCTION
Generalizations about the difference between crimes and torts usually
oversimplify. The standard "black letter" law distinction is a good illustra-
tion of this tendency. It holds that crimes represent injuries to society gener-
ally, while torts involve only private interests."i 0 Although this public/
private distinction dates back at least to Blackstone,"' it is a distinction
without a difference. Roscoe Pound stated the most important objection:
events that cause private injuries also cause public ones, because public inju-
ries are usually only private injuries writ large." 2 For example, an individ-
ual's private interest in the enforcement of a contract can also be described
as the collective, public interest in the security of transactions. The problem
with the public/private distinction, then, is that private and public injuries
are correlative, with the result, as Henry Hart said, "that society is inter-
ested also in the due fulfillment of contracts and the avoidance of traffic
accidents and most of the other stuff of civil litigation."" 3
108 See Hart, supra note 1, at 409; H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
SANCTION 65 (1968).
109 H. PACKER, supra note 108, at 65. This same point can be articulated in terms of
Robert Nozick's concerns, see infra notes 143-45, that those threatened but not injured,
are denied adequate compensation by the civil law. Here, those who must fear criminal
prosecution for negligence, but cannot avoid entanglement with the criminal law, are the
analogs in Nozick's population that fear injury.
110 For a discussion and critique of this view, see Drane & Neal, On Moral
Justification for the Tort/Crime Distinction, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 398, 402-03 (1980).
111 See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 2 (1768).
112 3 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 23-24, 328-30 (1959).
113 Hart, supra note 1, at 403. There is also an historical problem with the public/
private distinction. Put simply, the line between torts and crimes did not always exist.
Prior to the 12th century, the English criminal law was largely oriented toward securing
private compensation for victims and their families; guilt for most offenses, including any
forms of homicide, could be discharged by making a payment to them. See 2 F.
POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 448-67 (2d ed. 1968). This
state of affairs changed dramatically after the Norman Conquest, but the motor force
behind the new doctrinal development that any breach of the "King's Peace" was a
criminal offense against the crown seems to have been the King's desire to expand his
criminal jurisdiction as a means of enhancing his power, revenues, and patronage.
Because the fines and forfeitures resulting from expanded criminal jurisdiction went into
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Still, a kernel of an idea lurks in this distinction. Sometimes there are
public values that would be injured if criminal behavior were treated only as
tortious conduct for which the victim must be made whole through compen-
sation. Perhaps the clearest example of the insufficiency of compensation is
provided by the crime of rape.1 14 If compensation alone were the remedy,
not only would potential victims feel fear for which they would not be com-
pensated (because they were not attacked)," 5 but a distinct symbolic injury
would also remain: sexual inequality would be symbolically reinforced by a
legal rule that effectively entitled men to use women against their will in
return for judicially determined compensation. In Calabresi and Melamed's
language, property and inalienability rules would have been collapsed into a
liability rule." 6 In their analysis, all legal rules can be grouped into one of
three categories: (1) liability rules, which entitle one to trespass on the rights
of others so long as one pays judicially determined compensation; (2) prop-
erty rules, which require that the trespasser buy the right to trespass on
another's rights from the holder of the property right; and (3) inalienability
rules under which the trespass is prohibited even with the victim's consent.
Thus, to "price" rape would effectively convert an inalienability rule into a
liability rule.
This concern about collapsing all legal rules into liability rules is shared by
many within the standard "law and economics" school, but they insist on
finding an efficiency justification for their concern. From their perspective,
both tort and criminal law are simply means of controlling externalities.
Under Judge Posner's view, the special role of the criminal law is to channel
transactions into the marketplace, rather than rely on the courts to assess
liability and determine damages. 1 7 From his perspective, the advantage of
the criminal law is that it encourages voluntary transactions in the market-
place. Thus, while Posner is restating essentially Calabresi and Melamed's
property rule/liability rule distinction, he grounds the distinction in the
superiority of the market over judicially determined compensation."" Simi-
larly, Shavell explains the importance of intent and the lesser relevance of
actual harm to the criminal law in terms of their relationship to the
the royal purse (and not the victim's), the 12th century divorce of criminal law from tort
law can be seen as largely a wealth transfer from crime victims to the crown.
114 For the contrary view that asserts an "economic basis" for the criminality of rape,
see Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1198-99
(1985).
"15 This is Robert Nozick's point. See R. NozIcK, infra notes 143-45 and
accompanying text.
116 Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View
of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). They argue that society imposes
criminal penalties .with high expected values exceeding the damages to prevent
defendants from converting property and inalienability rules into liability rules.
117 Posner, supra note 114,
118 Id. at 1195-96. Note, however, that under Posner's view of rape, it is a property
rule (and not an inalienability rule) that would be collapsed into a liability rule.
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probability of future harm.'19 One who intends harm is more likely to
achieve it (and escape apprehension), he argues, and so needs to be
threatened by a higher expected penalty. These arguments have been dis-
puted by others and need not be pursued further here.'20 Instead, the focus
of this section will be on those rationales for the tort/crime distinction that
are not grounded on allocative efficiency.
A. The Criminal Law as a System of Moral Education
The counterview that the criminal law is shaped by nonefficiency consid-
erations usually begins from the premise that the criminal law has a unique
"educational role," within which it is one of the primary socializing forces
within society.' 2' More recently, this view has been rediscovered and articu-
lated in economic terms as a claim that the criminal law is, ultimately, a
social instrument for shaping preferences as much as opportunities. 22 Pro-
vocative as this view is, one must be careful here not to overstate the crimi-
nal law's capacity. Whether it can truly shape preferences is debatable;
crimes of theft, violence, and sexual exploitation have been with us for mil-
lennia. Similarly, despite decades of criminal prosecutions for income tax
evasion, few have learned to "prefer" paying taxes, although most have
learned that the consequences of deliberate evasion can include prison.
Taken seriously, the idea of the law engaging in "preference-shaping" has a
vaguely totalitarian sound; one thinks of "Clockwork Orange" and state-
engineered brainwashing. Thus, it seems more accurate to speak of the
"educational" role of the criminal law, to say that one learns what the public
morality is, even if one does not fully internalize it. Here, empirical evidence
is available to support the proposition that the criminal law is very effective
at teaching citizens what the contours of the public morality are.'23
The primacy of the educational or socializing role of the criminal law is
hardly a new idea. Herbert Packer wrote that the real impact of the legal
"threat" underlying the criminal law was "to create patterns of conforming
behavior and thereby to reduce the number of occasions on which the choice
of a criminal act presents itself.'' 124 Deterrence, he suggested, should be
"more broadly conceived as a complex psychological phenomenon meant
119 Shavell, supra note 13, at 1248. Attempts are punished, he argues, even though
they result in no harm, because they raise the expected value for criminal punishment.
Id. at 1250.
120 See, e.g., Dau-Schmidt, supra note 7, at 13.
121 F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME
CONTROL 72-83 (1973); Andenaes, General Prevention-Illusion or Reality, 43 J. CRIM.
L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 176, 179-80 (1952).
122 See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 7; see also T. TYLER, supra note 3.
123 T. TYLER, supra note 3; Ball & Friedman, supra note 24, at 220.
124 H. PACKER, supra note 108, at 43.
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primarily to create and reinforce the conscious morality and the unconscious
habitual controls of the law-abiding.' 125
Starting from this premise that the criminal law is a powerful socializing
force, one can attempt to explain some of the most distinctive doctrinal facts
about the criminal law, including the central role of intent, the limited rele-
vance of harm to the victim, and the use of incarceration as the characteris-
tic sanction of the criminal law. The importance of intent may lie in the
ability of socializing forces to work better with respect to conscious behavior
than unconscious behavior (although they can have a significant effect on the
latter as well). Hence, the criminal law should arguably concentrate on voli-
tional conduct and leave other legal forces to deal with negligence and
nonvolitional conduct. The irrelevance of actual harm to the criminal law
can be similarly explained on the ground that socializing forces focus on the
actor, not on the victim; thus, it is a sufficient justification for punishment
that the individual defendant will serve as an appropriate object lesson.
Finally, prison is the distinctive sanction of the criminal law because it ful-
fills a pedagogical function that fines do not. Not only are prisons highly
visible reminders of the deterrent threat of the law, but the use of imprison-
ment broadcasts a special communitarian message about the equality of all
citizens before the law. Because of the wealth differences among offenders
and the declining marginal utility of money, fines cannot communicate this
message, and, when used as an alternative to imprisonment, may undercut it.
The criminal law is then a uniquely effective medium for communicating a
communitarian ethic. Alone, it tells members of an audience who may iden-
tify themselves as belonging to very different communities (in terms of
wealth, race, etc.) that each is a citizen of the same society, subject to the
same duties and punishment. The use of imprisonment can symbolize the
equality of all before the law, and thus it affirms the existence of a single
community.
Other models of the criminal law--economic, retributive, or rehabilita-
tive-may also be able to account for these same distinctive doctrinal char-
acteristics of the criminal law.' 26 Accordingly, one can fairly ask whether
this perspective that sees the criminal law as an instrument of moral sociali-
zation can better explain any institutional characteristics of criminal law and
its administration. In several important respects, this perspective does pro-
vide explanations for institutional details that seem to elude other theories.
First, why does the criminal law insist on prohibiting, rather than pricing?
Second, why is tort law primarily compensatory in character, while criminal
125 Id. at 65.
126 For example, a rehabilitative model can justify the use of imprisonment as a
medium for affording treatment. A retributive model easily can explain the significance
of intent as measuring culpability. Economic theorists see intent as correlated to a higher
probability of harm and hence a need for a higher expected penalty. See supra notes 118-
20 and accompanying text.
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law is primarily punitive? Third, why is the criminal law not privately
enforced to a greater degree?
1. Prohibiting Versus Pricing
If we view the criminal law as largely a socializing system of moral propa-
ganda, reasons come into focus that explain why its natural style is to pro-
hibit rather than to price. The answer lies in the voice that such a system
must use. First, it must be clear and unequivocal, and, second, it prefers to
deal in moral absolutes. At least since Moses, the characteristic statement of
the criminal law has been "Thou shalt not . . . ." Why? Arguably, such
messages are more easily learned, internalized, and made habitual. In effect,
they shape the citizens' unconscious perceptions of the opportunities before
them so that occasions for unlawful, but profitable, behavior that would be
apparent to the amoral citizen are never truly apprehended by the law-abid-
ing citizen. In contrast, pricing decisions cannot be made habitual and nec-
essarily require conscious trade-offs. Moreover, they do nothing to reinforce
a communitarian ethic or promote social bonding. To the contrary, the indi-
vidual actor is inherently acting in a consciously self-regarding fashion. For
example, if criminal law were to adopt Learned Hand's rule for tort liability,
individuals would be asked to determine if the marginal benefit to them from
not taking additional precautions equalled or exceeded the marginal
expected costs that their conduct imposed on others. One suspects that indi-
viduals would tend to exaggerate their own costs and discount others' bene-
fits; thus, by definition the decision would be self-interested.
When the law wishes to authorize pricing decisions, its language is charac-
teristically soft-edged; it speaks of a rule of reason, of exercising due care
under the circumstances, or of negligence. The criminal law seldom speaks
in those terms. If it did, the command "Thou shalt not kill" would have
appended to it the exception, "unless the marginal benefit to you exceeds the
marginal cost to society." The point then is simple: rhetoric counts. Cer-
tain styles of rhetoric are naturally associated with different kinds of legal
rules. True commands, such as those stated by the criminal law, require an
unequivocal tone and the use of moral absolutes. Not only does a communi-
tarian ethic require moralistically unifying language, but the level of preci-
sion with which statements are deliberately phrased differs between the tort
and criminal law. As Dean Colin Diver has recognized, precision is not a
neutral concept.'27 The optimal degree of precision with which a legal rule is
stated depends on trade-offs among several factors. He suggests that the
more "transparent" a rule is (that is, the clearer and more universally
accepted are the meanings of the terms it uses), the more likely the rule is to
127 See Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983).
Diver suggests three dimensions along which legal rules can be measured: (1)
"transparency" (the clarity of the rule's terms), (2) "accessibility" (the ease with which it
can be applied to concrete fact patterns), and (3) "congruency" (the degree of congruence
between the rule and the law's underlying objectives). Id. at 66-71.
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be either underinclusive or overinclusive. On such a continuum, criminal
law and tort law are at opposite ends: the former's rules approach "trans-
parency," but historically were often underinclusive. Thus, the law of theft
struggled for a century to finci a way to deal with embezzlement. 128 Tort
law, in contrast, is seldom underinclusive, but its rules are typically far from
"transparent." Often, they require a retrospective and prolonged evaluation
of the facts, which means that they also rank low in terms of "accessibility."
As a result, such rules are incapable of performing a socializing function.
The distinction between pricing and prohibiting is closely related to a dis-
tinction that Professor Robert Cooter has drawn between "prices" and
"sanctions."' A key idea in Cooter's analysis is that a "sanction" (by
which he means a penalty intended to prohibit rather than simply to price)
inherently creates an abrupt, discontinuous jump in the costs the actor must
incur when he violates the legal standard. In contrast, this abrupt jump dis-
appears when a pricing system is used because prices are continuous and
thus bring costs and benefits into balance. As a result, a modest increase in
price levels will reduce significantly the level of violations of the legal stan-
dard, but a similar increase in sanction levels will have virtually no effect,
because sanctions are already set at a level more than adequate to deter.
When sanctions are used, the critical determination is not the price to set,
but the standard of conduct to mandate, because behavior will be extremely
responsive to even a small change in a legal standard that is backed by a
highly punitive sanction.
Cooter uses this analysis to develop an operational rule to determine when
a policy of prohibitory sanctions should be preferred to a pricing policy.
Assuming that information is not costless and that lawmakers face uncer-
tainty, he concludes that the central issue becomes the relative costs of infor-
mation to lawmakers. He advises:
If lawmakers can identify socially desirable behavior, but are prone to
error in assessing the costs of deviation from it, then sanctions are pref-
erable to prices. However, if officials can accurately measure the exter-
nal costs of behavior, but cannot accurately identify the socially
desirable level of it, then prices are preferable to sanctions."a
Although Cooter does not analyze the tort/crime distinction, his analysis
supplies a utilitarian foundation on which it might be grounded. One can
argue that in the case of torts, lawmakers have decided to follow a pricing
policy, while the criminal law represents a sanctioning policy. If so, "exces-
sive" fines are not a substantial problem, because sanctions were intended to
establish a sharp, discontinuous jump in the penalties society imposes for
"criminalized" conduct.
128 Tigar, supra note 26, at 1454-60, 1471.
129 See Cooter, supra note 12.
130 Id. at 1524.
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Although much in Cooter's analysis may be questioned,'' his focus on the
relative information costs of using prices and sanctions makes one point very
well. Society is better advised to use prices, not sanctions, when it has great
difficulty in specifying the precise standard of precaution to be observed.
This observation may help explain the historic reluctance of Anglo-Ameri-
can courts to criminalize negligence. Unquestionably, it would be infeasible
for society to specify the precautions to be observed across a wide variety of
contexts and by very different actors with the precision necessary to justify
the use of sanctions. In contrast, pricing can be done retrospectively when a
court determines whether to impose liability.
Cooter's analysis has an important point of contact with those traditional
commentators on criminal law who emphasize blameworthiness as the crite-
rion for criminal liability. As Cooter recognizes, lawmakers cannot ordina-
rily specify a standard of care without first measuring the external costs
caused by deviations from it. In other words, Cooter's focus on the relative
information costs of determining standards versus determining external costs
seems pointless if, in order to determine the efficient standard, one must first
determine the external costs attributable to a particular form of conduct.
But Cooter's answer to this problem is that lawmakers can often look to
community standards (either standards adopted within an industry or a pro-
fession or expressed in well-established moral norms) because such stan-
dards, having weathered the test of time or being the product of market
forces, are presumptively efficient.
This suggestion that community standards are efficient and so may be
enforced by sanctions that represent a discontinuous jump in threatened pen-
alties can be simplified, with only minor distortion, into the claim that com-
131 Generally, Cooter gives little attention to the risk of nondetection. Rather, he
seems to assume that the actor's private costs equal the social costs of his conduct. In
general, this can be true only if the probability of detection approaches 100% or if the
actor faces multiple damages that offset the margin by which the risk of apprehension
falls below 100%. In all other cases, setting prices equal to the social costs of the actor's
behavior will not work because at least on some occasions the actor can avoid payment of
this price. Similarly, Cooter's analysis pays little attention to the compensatory aims of
the law, which this Article views as the more basic reason for separating the civil and
criminal law. Whereas damages in civil actions typically go to private plaintiffs,
sanctions go to the state. As a result, recognizing that some rate of accidents is
inevitable, lawmakers might prefer tort remedies to sanctions in order to achieve
compensation. Not only is this explanation for the overlap of tort law with criminal law
glossed over by the simple dichotomy of prices and sanctions, but none of the factors
analyzed by Cooter can explain why tort law and criminal law do in fact overlap. Under
his assumption, either prices or sanctions should work.
Finally, the institution of punitive damages seems inconsistent with viewing tort law as
simply a system of prices. If an actor assumes that tort liability sets a price that when
paid permits him to engage-purposely and intentionally-in the taxed activity, he will
be sorely disappointed to learn that the deliberate character of his actions subjects him to
liability for punitive damages.
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munity standards may be enforced by criminal statutes on efficiency
grounds. Moreover, although Cooter does not focus on the offender's own
perceived utility from the crime, it is implicit from his analysis that his
"sanctions" are intended to "prohibit"-that is, remove any incentive for the
offender to engage in the unlawful activity to any degree.
The bottom line then is that from two very different perspectives (one
focused on efficiency, the other on the educational and socializing roles of
the criminal law) a common thread emerges that the criminal law normally
intends to prohibit, not price. A positive model of the criminal law should
start from that premise.
2. When Should the Criminal Law Price?
All arguments have their logical limits, and the claim that the criminal
law should prohibit rather than price misbehavior has its doctrinal bounda-
ries also. Normally, when we think of the criminal law, we visualize it pun-
ishing intentional actions willfully engaged in by the defendant. Yet, the
criminal law also can be used to punish negligent acts, to impose strict liabil-
ity, and to hold persons vicariously liable for the acts of others. In such
circumstances, the statement that the criminal law should treat the defend-
ant's conduct as lacking social utility (and therefore should impose high pen-
alties without concern for overdeterrence) makes little sense. The negligent
defendant is frequently engaged in activities that have social utility and,
indeed, is the same person with whom the law of torts regularly deals.
Hence, to the extent that these forms of misbehavior are considered
"crimes," the law should "price" the misbehavior-that is, seek to force the
defendant to internalize the costs it imposes on others.
This view that the law should "price" those forms of criminal liability that
are essentially exceptions to the usual "method" of the criminal law has
obvious relevance to the topic of corporate criminal liability. Arguably, the
corporation is being held liable for acts of its agents that it may have sought
to prevent. From this perspective, the only policy issue is how heavily the
law should tax the corporation in order to induce it to monitor its agents
more closely to preyent future illegality. So framed, it quickly becomes obvi-
ous that severe penalties to encourage monitoring are not necessarily cost
justified. Economically, it would be irrational to spend one million dollars
on monitoring to prevent losses of a much smaller amount. Inevitably, mon-
itoring expenditures must be keyed to the size of the expected loss. In turn,
this conclusion implies that in sentencing corporations courts should price
the violation because ultimately what they are doing is encouraging preven-
tive measures in much the same way that tort law does. Indeed, to the
extent that the corporation already has state-of-the-art monitoring controls
in place, low penalties would appear appropriate from this perspective, even
if these controls demonstrably failed, because there would seem to be little
more that society would wish the corporation to do to prevent illegality by
its agents.
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This analysis assumes, however, that the corporation is truly interested in
monitoring its agents. In fact, if corporate penalties were greatly reduced to
reflect the adoption of corporate compliance plans or other monitoring sys-
tems, corporations would rationally develop an interest in cosmetic monitor-
ing-so that they could both benefit from illegal behavior and also incur
only modest penalties, if apprehended. The arguments on both sides of this
issue closely resemble the traditional economic analysis of strict liability ver-
sus a negligence-based system of tort law. Generally, economists recognize
that under either a strict liability system (which vicarious corporate respon-
sibility essentially amounts to) or a negligence system of liability, defendants
will take precautions only up to the point where the expected legal liability
equals the precaution and avoidance costs."3 2 The claimed superiority of a
negligence system is that it achieves the same level of precaution as strict
liability without making the corporation an insurer for acts by others that it
cannot prevent.
The validity of this argument depends, however, on whether corporate
criminal liability's only role is to induce the installation of monitoring con-
trols to detect and prevent reckless agents from acting illegally. The alterna-
tive possibility is that corporate liability prevents others within the
corporation from pressuring these same agents into illegality. The danger is
that senior corporate officials could simultaneously pressure lower echelons,
while also maintaining a plausible monitoring system for illegality. So long
as the pressure to engage in crime marginally exceeded the preventive effect
of the monitoring controls, these officials and shareholders could have the
best of both worlds: the fruits of illegality with low corporate penalties.
From this perspective, monitoring systems may sometimes function less as a
preventive device than as an insurance policy to reduce the legal losses, if
caught. In short, those at higher echelons could rationally invest in feigned
or cosmetic monitoring in order to minimize both their own personal liabil-
ity and corporate liability if their agent were apprehended.
Vicarious responsibility is also necessary because the corporation serves as
a second best substitute when we cannot identify the real decisionmaker.
Because feigned monitoring obviously has no social utility, its detection
should justify harsh or "prohibitory" penalties, rather than pricing. But can
courts distinguish real from feigned or cosmetic monitoring efforts? In prin-
ciple, there are many ways to frustrate a monitoring system; covert signals
from senior corporate management can send the implicit message through-
out the organization that compliance with law is desirable, but increased
profitability is mandatory. Extreme pressure for increased profits or reduced
costs carries the message that it is up to the lower echelons to find the means
necessary to achieve those goals. Public corporations in particular are com-
plex organizations, and it is possible for them to send contradictory messages
to those in their lower to middle echelons. Exposed to the remote threat of
132 See R. POSNER, supra note 57, at § 6.5.
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criminal prosecution and the clear and present threat of dismissal, lower
echelon employees know to which message it is more in their interest to
respond.
The bottom line is this: if there is evidence suggesting pressure to induce
the criminal behavior from senior levels within the corporation or evidence
that persons at such a level sought to thwart internal monitoring controls,
then society should use penalties designed to prohibit, not price. In such
cases, we are again confronting behavior that lacks social utility, not the
question of how heavily to tax the corporation in order to induce monitor-
ing. Above all, any indication that senior management had advance knowl-
edge, or even a reckless awareness of a substantial possibility, of the crime
should lead to a judicial conclusion that the crime was "intended" by the
corporation or, in other words, that corporate liability should not be consid-
ered "vicarious," but intentional (and, therefore, the misbehavior should be
prohibited and not priced). Where one draws this line can be debated,'33 but
it is noteworthy that neither the English law on corporate criminal liability
nor the Model Penal Code adopts the federal rule under which the corpora-
tion is vicariously liable for illegal acts by any employee intended to benefit
the corporation." Rather, both require the involvement of a more senior
corporate official.'i" Although it is unlikely that the federal rule will be
modified, the involvement of a more senior corporate official should be the
breakpoint at which sentencing policy shifts from a "pricing" approach to a
"prohibitory" one, because it suggests that any monitoring efforts engaged in
by the corporation were probably cosmetic.
3. Private Enforcement and the Criminal Law
Historically, early English criminal law was compensatory in character.
Tort and crime were not clearly distinguishable, and the making of a tariff
payment of the "bot" to the injured and the "wite" to the King could atone
even for a homicide.1' Private enforcement at this time was the norm, and,
133 In my judgment, the line should be drawn in terms of whether a corporate official,
who had equivalent or senior rank to those responsible for corporate monitoring activities
in the relevant area, was implicated in the criminal behavior.
134 For a discussion of the federal rule, see supra note 8.
135 Under English law, the corporation is not normally criminally liable for the acts of
its agents or employees, but only for those of agents possessing sufficient power and
responsibility within the firm that they represent "alter egos" to the corporation. See L.
H. LEIGH, THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS IN ENGLISH LAW 29-43
(1969). Some English decisions have asked whether the responsible individual whose
conduct provided the basis for imputing liability to the corporation represented the
"brains" of the organization. Id. at 37-38; see also John Henshall (Quarries) Ltd. v.
Harvey [1965] 2 Q.B. 233.
The Model Penal Code essentially adopts a similar, but more expansive, view requiring
only that a "high managerial agent" be involved in authorizing or ratifying the crime.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07; see supra note 8.
1I See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 113, at 451.
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in Great Britain, it persisted until relatively recently. The decline in private
enforcement of the criminal law correlates closely with the criminal law's
shift away from a compensatory character. The simple claim made in this
section is that a system of law that seeks to prohibit, rather than to price,
cannot rely on private enforcement for that purpose-without at least par-
tially sacrificing the compensatory goals of the law. Arguably, such a sacri-
fice may be justified: the trade-off cannot be ignored, and it may explain why
tort law and criminal law are institutionally segregated so that one focuses
principally on compensation and the other principally on deterrence.
To understand this point, consider the case where the gains and losses
from a crime are asymmetric, with the defendant's gains exceeding the vic-
tim's losses. For example, X's conduct injures Y to the extent of $500,000
but benefits X to the extent of $1,000,000. If we depend upon private
enforcement, then, at least in a world of perfect information and low trans-
action costs, the plaintiff Y will recover $500,000. As a result, we will get
pricing, but not prohibition. In short, private litigation produces only the
standard Coasean solution under which the defendant would be able to
negotiate in advance to engage in the misconduct.
Of course, variations can be envisioned under which private litigation
might deter the criminal behavior. For example, punitive or multiple dam-
ages could be awarded that would both compensate and deter, and these
civil penalties could be assessed in private litigation. The RICO statute is an
example of such an approach." 7 If damages exceeding the actual loss can
thus be awarded in private litigation, it might seem efficient to adopt a uni-
tary proceeding that both assessed punishment and awarded damages,
thereby reducing the private and public costs of multiple forums. But there
are problems with this approach. First, high punitive damages, if privately
enforced, would generate a perverse incentive to bring frivolous claims (at
least if the claimant or his attorney could receive damages in excess of the
actual loss-i.e., a windfall)." s In short, from this perspective, prosecutorial
discretion is safer than relying on the self-interest of plaintiffs.
Arguably, this objection is insufficient, as one can easily imagine a system
in which the plaintiff would keep only actual damages and the punitive com-
ponent of the damages would go to the state. Still, problems again arise with
even this variation: as the damages increase, the rational defendant will be
less willing to settle and will expend more resources on the litigation. Mean-
while, the plaintiff's expected recovery remains unchanged, and so it will not
increase its investment in the action correspondingly. Indeed, under a high
enough multiple damages formula, the defendant could rationally be willing
to spend more funds in defense of the litigation than the plaintiff could
137 See Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.
§ 1964(c) (1988) (authorizing treble damage recovery to anyone injured in his business or
property by a RICO violation).
138 Certainly, this is the claim that the business community constantly makes about
RICO.
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expect to receive from it. The resulting differential in their respective will-
ingness to fund the litigation is likely to reduce both the rate of plaintiff
victories and the amount of compensation recovered. Because plaintiffs do
not have unlimited resources, they would have to abandon their lawsuits or
settle them more cheaply, in direct proportion to the extent that their
expected gain declines in relation to the defendant's expected loss.
To generalize, any asymmetry between the expected gain or loss to each
side will have a distorting effect on the substantive outcomes that otherwise
would have prevailed. As a result, the compensatory goals of the law will
tend to be compromised once we introduce a punitive component into the
civil law. One of two kinds of distortion can result. If the plaintiff gets the
punitive damages, an incentive to bring weak claims arises, because these
claims now can have a positive settlement value above the plaintiff's costs.
Conversely, if the punitive component (i.e., the damages above the compen-
satory level) goes to the state, plaintiffs will receive lower recoveries because
the defendants will have a greater incentive to litigate.
These arguments that the compensatory and deterrent goals of the law do
not mix well requires one more step before the case is fully made. In theory,
even if private enforcement could not generate adequate deterrence for the
reasons just discussed, public enforcement might seek both deterrence and
compensation. For example, consider a system in which only the state is
permitted to assert civil litigation-at least after a criminal prosecution has
been commenced concerning the same conduct. Conceivably, such a single
enforcer could pursue the entire recovery from the defendant (that is, both
the fine and the civil damages). However, old problems would resurface in a
new form under such a system because the public enforcer might not have as
strong an incentive to pursue the private damages for victims as it would the
state's fine. In settlements, it might trade off the victim's interests against
the state's. Again, the goal of compensation would be compromised. In
addition, new problems would arise. First, private enforcement may benefit
from the highly competitive legal marketplace that allows claimants to shop
for legal services at the lowest cost. Ineffective lawyers probably survive
longer in bureaucracies than in markets. Second, a state monopoly over
legal enforcement also would create a nightmarish problem of rent-seek-
ing. l3 9 Because unlimited resources cannot be committed to legal enforce-
ment, allocation decisions would have to be made. Predictably, interest
groups would lobby for these scarce resources to be committed to the legal
claims that benefit them.140
139 Rent-seeking refers to the efforts of powerful interest groups to influence and shape
legislation and administrative action to protect their special interests. For a summary of
the literature, see Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 63, 85-89 (1990).
140 For example, tenants might wish to see fewer resources devoted to enforcing the
claims of landlords; corporations might wish priority given to embezzlement cases; and
frustrated job applicants, to discrimination claims. In short, all the problems with
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The bottom line of this seemingly abstract analysis is that plausible effi-
ciency arguments exist for segregating the compensatory and deterrent goals
of the law into distinct legal institutions that play by different rules. The
market environment in which private clients find private attorneys may be
best for civil enforcement, while economies of scope and scale may make
public enforcement the vastly superior mechanism by which to implement
the criminal law. Hence, the current structure of institutional arrangements
supports the claim that typically the criminal law prohibits, while civil law
prices.
B. Normative Arguments
To this point, this section has argued that the criminal law generally seeks
to prohibit, rather than price, and that this recognition is essential to a realis-
tic positive model of the criminal law. But such arguments do not state the
normative case for using the criminal law to prohibit, rather than to price.
Such arguments can be advanced, however, from both a distributive justice
standpoint and a libertarian perspective.
From the standpoint of distributive justice, a key point about the criminal
law is that the price exacted from the defendant (i.e., the fine) goes to the
state, not the victim. As a result, even if it were possible to price the crimi-
nal behavior so that defendants internalized the external costs they imposed
on others, their victims would not receive compensation. Thus, an involun-
tary wealth transfer would result. Of course, one answer would be for the
state to redistribute the fine to the crime victims,1 41 but the practical obsta-
cles to such state-run redistribution are immense.
A second and even more intractable problem with the pricing of crime
also involves the unavailability of compensation." 4 In seeking to justify the
institution of criminal punishment, Robert Nozick asks why forcing offend-
replacing a market with state planning appear, and are compounded by the decentralized
character of legal enforcement. For example, parties foreign to the local jurisdiction
could expect very little assistance.
141 In essence, this is the Kaldor/Hicks definition of efficiency, but the usual objections
to that definition apply here with the same force. See, e.g., Posner, The Ethical and
Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.
487, 488-97 (1980) (describing Kaldor-Hicks's efficiency as allowing an involuntary
taking, provided that the act creates wealth sufficient to compensate all parties). For
example, economists have recently focused on the "rent-seeking" behavior that occurs in
government as various groups lobby for the state's resources or protective legislation. See
Hovenkamp, supra note 139, at 85-89. If such intense lobbying is normal and affects the
allocation of state controlled resources, it would suggest that crime victims would lose to
more powerful political forces that would also want this new wealth source (fines) used to
their advantage.
142 Obviously, some injuries strike us as uncompensable. Presumably, few would
accept the damages paid under a wrongful death statute in return for their lives. If so,
conduct causing such injuries again results in an involuntary wealth transfer. More
importantly, rent-seeking behavior seems likely to interfere with any simple transfer of
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ers to compensate their victims is not a sufficient response to a violation of a
citizen's rights.14 From his extreme libertarian perspective, punishment is
justifiable only when compensation will be inadequate. Nozick gives a sur-
prising answer to his question: compensation will always be inadequate, he
argues, for many forms of misconduct.'" Why? Because, he concludes, the
possibility of such conduct creates fear, not only among the actual victims,
but also among others who are potentially subject to similar victimization. 4"
This fear on the part of the potential victim who is not in fact injured cannot
be compensated, Nozick argues, because no offender actually violated that
person's rights. Hence, private compensation is always inadequate because
of the existence of this class of uncompensated potential victims. As a result,
the state is justified, he concludes, in establishing public institutions of crimi-
nal justice-at least with respect to those crimes that create a generalized
sense of fear affecting persons other than actual victims.
Although Nozick uses his concept of a general state of fear to justify the
existence of the criminal law, this concept also provides a normative founda-
tion for the claim that the criminal law should prohibit and not price. If
potential victims will not receive compensation for their fear, then a pricing
system that tries only to force the offender to internalize the costs imposed
on others seems destined to fail. For example, no system of pricing can hold
the burglar liable for all future apartment dwellers who live in fear because
of his crime. In short, once Nozick's category of "fear" is recognized as a
legitimate variable that must be considered among the external harms that
the price must cover, then, in Cooter's terminology, all "prices" would
become "sanctions." To be sure, not all crimes produce fear in Nozick's
sense, but this observation only raises a line-drawing problem that is best
postponed until Part III.
C. The Debate over Overcriminalization
Probably the strongest proponents of the view that the criminal law is
essentially as much a system of socialization as of prevention were the lead-
ers of the Legal Process school. Today, this school is often viewed as being
simply a normative counterreaction to the Legal Realist movement and the
latter's allegedly excessive emphasis on the individual discretion possessed
by judges and other lawmakers.1" While the Legal Realists stressed that by
ordering and interpreting the relevant facts, the legal decisionmaker had de
facto opportunities to reach an outcome consistent with his own value pref-
the offender's payments from the state to the crime victims. The point made in the text,
however, is that even when compensation would work, it is not available.
143 R. NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 58-71 (1974).
14 Id. at 58-59.
145 Id. at 65-71.
146 See, e.g., Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 467, 507 (1988) ("[L]egal
process thinkers reacted to legal realism by relying on majority rule as the sole
uncontroversial principle left in the legal system.").
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erences, the Legal Process school emphasized instead the institutional con-
straints on decisionmaking. From the Legal Process perspective, issues
arose in "the context of Some established and specific procedure of deci-
sion., 147 The right answer to a question thus often depended on who was
answering, because "each agency of decision must take account always of its
own place in the institutional system and of what is necessary to maintain
the integrity and workability of the system as a whole."'" This is more a
theory of political science than of jurisprudence, and its concerns are less
with the moral foundations of the criminal law than with how the criminal
law fits within the overall institutional structure of democratic government.
From this starting point, Henry Hart, the intellectual father of the move-
ment, had little difficulty in describing the criminal law's defining character:
"What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction and all that distin-
guishes it ... is the judgment of community condemnation which accompa-
nies and justifies its imposition."149 Crime then, in this view, is conduct that,
once proven, "will incur a formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral
condemnation of the community."' Accordingly, it followed from this
first step that the scope of the criminal law should include only behavior that
the community as a whole would consider "blameworthy."
While Hart's analysis would thus parallel Cooter's in acknowledging the
relevance of community standards, Hart was not concerned with efficiency
and had at most a secondary concern with deterrence. For him, the criminal
law was illegitimate when utilitarian considerations (such as deterrability)
caused its sanctions to be used against persons whose conduct was not
blameworthy.' Although Hart wrote before federal prosecutors began to
give priority to "white collar" criminal prosecutions, he was openly skeptical
of the use of criminal statutes to enforce economic regulations. 152 In any
event, Hart's themes were directly applied to the context of economic regula-
tions by an intellectual descendent, Professor Sanford Kadish. Writing
shortly after the 1960s price-fixing cases in which executives of major corpo-
rations were sent to prison for the first time, Kadish warned that the use of
147 Hart, supra note 1, at 402.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 404.
150 Id. at 405.
15' Id. at 422.
152 He expressly favored the "flexible and imaginative adoption of civil penalties to fit
particular regulatory problems [because of] the greater reasonableness of such penalties,
and their more ready enforceability." Id. at 423. Writing in 1958, he concluded that,
even as of that date, "[t]here are more strict liability and other criminal statutes on the
books than investigators and prosecutors, with their existing staffs, can hope to
enforce.... Nor is there any pretense that most of them are seriously enforced." Id. at
423.
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criminal law simply to place a tax on disfavored behavior would rob the
criminal law of its distinctive force. 15
The central theme in both Hart's and Kadish's critiques was that the
criminal law would be devalued if it were to be used to express not society's
moral revulsion, but merely its utilitarian preferences. This argument drew
a sharp retort from those who favored the increased use of the criminal law
against high-status offenders. Drawing on sociological studies, Professors
Ball and Friedman challenged the idea that the criminal law would lose its
unique status in the public's mind simply because it was employed to penal-
ize behavior not historically thought to be "criminal" in nature." 4 They
argued that the relationship between the criminal law and the public moral-
ity was interactive and reciprocal. Each affected the other, and, to a degree,
the public learned what was immoral from what was made criminal."
Although Ball and Friedman had only a limited data base upon which to
generalize at the time they wrote, subsequent events seem to confirm their
position. Each of the major "white collar" scandals of recent decades-the
price-fixing scandals in the electrical equipment industry of the 1960s, the
foreign payments scandal of the 1970s and the insider trading revelations of
the 1980s-shocked and aroused the American public. In general, the pub-
lic has shown little apprehension about the use of the criminal sanction in
these cases, but rather has applauded its use. No one who has followed the
media coverage of the Ivan Boesky or Michael Milken prosecutions can
doubt the attitude of the American public: it has wanted prison sentences
imposed-substantial ones. In part, this may simply reflect the public's
enjoyment of the spectacle of the once mighty made humble, but the possi-
bility at least exists that those commentators who predicted an erosion in
respect for the criminal law if it was used to enforce economic regulations
have either overestimated the legal sophistication of the American public or
underestimated its appetite for bread and circuses. Possibly, the public is
more concerned about being victimized by the underlying offenses, or possi-
bly it simply does not believe that it will be at risk from such prosecutions.
Whatever the reason, the public may not share the legal profession's unease
with strict liability offenses.
The problem with the Hart and Kadish overcriminalization thesis is then
that it tries to rest an essentially normative argument against overextension
of the criminal law on the debatable empirical claim that the public will lose
respect for the criminal law. In fact, the public's image of the criminal law
in operation is probably shaped by the outcomes in a few high visibility
cases. In the antitrust scandals of the 1960s, the public was presented with
the spectacle of middle-echelon executives at General Electric, Westing-
153 See Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing
Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 424 (1963); see also Kadish, The Crisis of
Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS 157 (1957).
114 See Ball & Friedman, supra note 24, at 206-07.
x5 Id. at 209-14.
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house and other major firms meeting clandestinely in motel rooms at night
to fix prices; in the 1970s "questionable payments" controversy, payments
that closely resembled bribes were made to major political and governmental
leaders around the globe; and in the 1980s "insider trading" scandals, the
public learned of briefcases stuffed with money moving among New York
investment bankers, much as the cocaine industry moves money in Miami.
Understandably, these cases looked to the public like criminal behavior. In
contrast, the more marginal cases on which Part I of this Article focused, in
which strict liability has been imposed or the criminal law has been overlaid
on basically aspirational civil standards, have received little public attention.
Still, in the last analysis, there is no necessary contradiction between the
Hart/Kadish view that overcriminalization will bring the law into disrespect
and the Ball and Friedman view that the public learns what is immoral from
what is prosecuted. Both could occur simultaneously, and this would simply
represent an application of the psychologist's familiar principle of cognitive
dissonance. That is, the public may react in both directions, lowering both
its estimation of the criminal law and also its tolerance for the particular
practice subjected to criminal prosecution. Ball and Friedman have focused
only on the second transition in reporting that conduct that is criminally
punished becomes conduct that the community thereafter deems immoral,
and their research does not truly address whether there was also a concomi-
tant erosion in respect for the law.
Even if a general decline in the community's respect for law does not
result from increased use of the criminal sanction, this should not end the
debate about overcriminalization. One flaw in Hart's conceptualization of
the law's educational role is his reification of the community as a single,
indivisible body of public opinion. American society is too large, diverse,
and specialized for such a concept to be generally meaningful. Moreover,
the "technicalization" of crime discussed earlier means that the broad mass
of public opinion will never quite understand what the law required or why
the behavior was illegal.1" However, it is not necessary to educate or social-
ize all of society. What Hart should have recognized is that the educational
and socializing role of the criminal law focuses principally on specialized
audiences within the broader society. While all of society cannot be edu-
cated as to the specialized requirements of the SEC, EPA, or OSHA, a rele-
vant business or professional community can be. Sometimes this specialized
community can be induced to internalize new community standards. For
example, both price-fixing and insider trading represent crimes that, in my
judgment, are today accepted as criminal by the relevant affected commu-
nity. Conversely, when strict liability criminal statutes are used, it is less
likely that the prohibited behavior will be internalized, and some possibility
156 "Stock parking," an area newly criminalized, supplies a good illustration. One
doubts that 10% of the educated public could define what this crime entails. Indeed,
there is no federal statute explicitly announcing under what circumstances stock parking
will be illegal. See United States v. Corr, 543 F.2d 1042 (2d Cir. 1976).
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exists that it will generate hostility and resistance Thus, even if there is not
a general erosion in public respect for law and even if there is increased
general deterrence, the criminal law may fail in its principal socializing mis-
sion-making law compliance habitual within the relevant population of
potential offenders.
Another way to express much the same point is to say that stigma is a
scarce resource. Society does not have an unlimited capacity to express con-
demnation or to feel revulsion. A little noticed fact about the major modem
episodes of "white collar" criminal prosecutions has been their presentation
to the public as newly developed crises: a crisis of price-fixing in the 1960s,
of illegal payments in the 1970s, and of insider trading in the 1980s. In fact,
the behavior in question in each case was not particularly new. What the
public was actually witnessing is more accurately described not as a crime
wave, but as a prosecution wave. Nonetheless, from the public's perspective,
there was an urgency to these cases that justified the resort to the criminal
sanction. In contrast, when the criminal law is applied to more mundane
crimes on a continuing basis, the public may grow indifferent to whether the
prosecution is civil or criminal in hature. At this point, Professor Hart's
fears will have been realized: the criminal law will have lost its distinctive
character.
III. SEPARATING TORT FROM CRIME: TOWARD IMPLEMENTATION
Part I of this Article argued that the realm of the criminal law is
expanding, as behavior that was once considered merely tortious or a regula-
tory violation is now prosecuted as a crime, often under statutes that provide
for significant penalties but give only a diminished role to the defendant's
mental awareness of the factors establishing his culpability. The driving
force behind this transition is two-fold. First, tortious conduct can impose
enormous externalities upon society, and in some of the new areas where the
criminal sanction is being used- worker safety, toxic dumping, securities
fraud--existing tort and regulatory remedies are generally believed not to
have produced adequate deterrence. Second, use of the criminal sanction is
easy to defend on utilitarian grounds. It seems to work and is not signifi-
cantly more costly than civil prosecutions. In short, public authorities get a
bigger bang for the buck.
Part II then argued that this utilitarian justification for expansion of the
criminal category threatens to conflict with the educational and socializing
role of the criminal law. Still, there is no immutable line between crime and
tort. Rather, this Article has suggested that the line depends primarily on
whether society is willing to recognize social utility in the value that the
criminal derives from the criminal behavior. If it does, the strategy should
be to price, rather than to prohibit, in order to minimize the external
costs.'57 Conversely, when society wishes to prohibit the behavior, it cannot
157 To restate the distinction, if X, by defrauding Z of $100, can realize $200
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permit the offender to derive any benefits from the activity without under-
cutting the educational and socializing impact of the criminal law. Gener-
ally, society seeks to prohibit (rather than price) those activities that violate
fundamental community standards. Yet, over time, society can and does
decide that some activities, which formerly were only priced, should be pro-
hibited. Unlawful toxic dumping seems a clear example of a form of con-
duct where society's attitude has changed. Once this might have been seen
as simply a regulatory matter-a malum prohibitum offense in the language
of an earlier era-but today it is more likely to be viewed as behavior that
knowingly endangers human life. Community standards have changed, and
they will continue to do so.
Admittedly, substantial problems of implementation surround any
attempt to operationalize a distinction between pricing and prohibiting.
Two stand out: (1) the "real world" continuum of criminal behavior, rang-
ing from the trivial to the egregious, has few, if any, obvious partitions; thus,
an abrupt shift from a "pricing" policy of incremental cost increases to a
"prohibitory" policy of sharp, discontinuous jumps in penalty levels may
seem unjustified; and (2) the competence of juries to judge issues of social
utility seems highly questionable. Nonetheless, to shift from pricing to
prohibiting without framing some role for the jury as fact-finder might be
thought to trivialize the constitutional safeguards surrounding the trial
stage.
The most feasible answers to both these problems dovetail. Put simply,
the existence or non-existence of criminal intent supplies a traditional jury
issue that also furnishes the most practical breakpoint at which to shift from
pricing to prohibiting. To illustrate the kind of criminal intent on which the
jury should be asked to focus, it is useful to return to a case briefly noted
earlier: United States v. Sellers."s In Sellers, the court refused to give a jury
instruction that required the jury to find that the defendant realized that his
disposal of waste substances "could be harmful to others or the environ-
ment."' 9 To be sure, such a level of mens rea is not constitutionally
required, but this focus on harm to others supplies a practical test, readily
comprehensible to a jury, for determining when the defendant's conduct
knowingly lacks any claim to social utility (and. hence should be subject to
"sanctions," rather than "prices" in Professor Cooter's terminology). Ide-
ally, criminal legislation might therefore distinguish two grades of the crime
of toxic dumping: the higher grade requiring a subjective perception by the
defendant of the serious risk of harm to others, and the lower grade not.
-The former might be "prohibited," and the latter "priced."
overnight, society may wish to deprive X of all the benefit (through fines or civil
restitution). In such a case, it is prohibiting. If it seeks to cancel only the loss to Z, then
it is pricing.
158 See supra notes 74 and 77.
159 926 F.2d at 416.
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Such an approach might be ideal, but it is also constitutionally permissible
for the court to engage in this same inquiry at sentencing."0
A. The Role of the Sentencing Commission
The line drawing problems in determining whether to price or to prohibit
are obviously difficult, both because community standards may properly
shift over time and because a retrospective factual examination of the partic-
ular case will frequently be necessary to see on which side of the line it
should fall. Where does this leave us in terms of policy options? First, it
suggests that the line between tort and crime cannot feasibly be constitution-
alized. In any event, there is virtually no possibility that the Supreme Court
would attempt to draw such a line. Recurrently, the Court has suggested
that "a crime is anything which the legislature chooses to say it is."'' It has
upheld strict liability offenses, 62 and has been unwilling even to treat "vic-
timlesg" crimes involving consensual sexual conduct as beyond the legisla-
ture's reach. 6" Only in Lambert v. California.. did the Court suggest any
limits on what the legislature could criminalize, and the more than three
decades that have passid since that decision have confirmed Justice Frank-
furter's prediction in his dissent that the decision would "turn out to be an
isolated deviation from the strong current of precedents-a derelict on the
160 Constitutionally, the sentencing court is not limited to the facts proven at trial, but
may consider other factors, including even other uncharged crimes. See United States v.
Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). Of course, due
process safeguards should surround this process, but under the governing case law it may
still remain relatively informal.
161 Hart, supra note 1, at 432 (discussing Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218
U.S. 57, 67-69 (1910) and United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488, 497-98 (1911)).
162 United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) (shipment of contaminated food in
interstate commerce); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) (shipment of
misbranded or adulterated drugs in interstate commerce); United States v. Behrman, 258
U.S. 280 (1922) (prescription of narcotics to known addicts); United States v. Balint, 258
U.S. 250 (1922) (unauthorized sale of narcotics).
163 Absent constitutional protection as a fundamental right, even consensual sexual
conduct is within the scope of the state legislature's power to criminalize. See, e.g.,
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding the constitutionality of a Georgia
statute criminalizing sodomy).
16 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (invalidating a Los Angeles felon-registration ordinance as
applied to a person lacking actual knowledge of a duty to register); see also Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding that the Eighth Amendment barred
convicting a defendant based on "status" as a narcotics addict, based on the finding that
such status may be "contracted innocently or involuntarily"). But cf. Powell v. Texas,
392 U.S. 514 (1968) (refusing to extend the reasoning in Robinson to protect a chronic
alcoholic from punishment for public drunkenness). Powell seems for the present to
signal that Robinson will not be extended to related areas.
[Vol. 71:193
TOR T/CRIME DISTINCTION
waters of the law." 1 Perhaps it should not be, but the momentum for
change seems lacking.
If the courts will not draw a line between tort and crime, the legislature
might still be asked to do so. But such an appeal seems even more likely to
be unsuccessful. Criminal legislation is enacted for a variety of reasons:
sometimes as an ad hoc, often hasty response to a perceived crisis; sometimes
as an afterthought; sometimes as a means of dignifying the status of a federal
agency so that knowing violations of its administrative rules can be crimi-
nally prosecuted. Whatever the reason, there is usually a constituency that
wants criminalization, and seldom one that visibly opposes it. To oppose
criminalization usually places an individual legislator in the exposed position
of appearing not to consider the subject matter of the statute sufficiently
serious to merit serious penalties. Such perceived insensitivity can be politi-
cally harmful, if not fatal. More importantly, any attempt to draw statutory
lines that better distinguish "true" criminal behavior from merely tortious
behavior would involve an effort of heroic complexity, and in all likelihood it
would produce problems with which courts would struggle for decades. Not
only would the charging and trial stages become more complex, but it is
ultimately doubtful that satisfactory lines can be drawn in advance. Too
many details matter, and hence a retrospective evaluation is necessary.
Another group that might be appealed to is prosecutors themselves.
Prosecutorial guidelines could be adopted seeking to decriminalize negligent
or strict liability offenses.Y Yet, for prosecutors to decide systematically
not to prosecute what the legislature has deemed criminal is also a politically
dangerous act, one that seems to undermine the legislature's position as the
sovereign lawmaker. Thus, although such prosecutorial guidelines and poli-
cies would normally be lawful, x67 they would undoubtedly draw criticism
from the regulatory bodies whose enforcement powers would thereby be cur-
tailed, as well as from their legislative allies.
In my judgment, this leaves one agency with an incentive to undertake
systematically the task of determining when to price and when to prohibit a
particular type of misconduct: the United States Sentencing Commission.
Established by Congress in 1984 to draft presumptive sentencing guide-
lines, 1" it cannot avoid this question without shirking its legislatively
imposed duty. To be sure, the Commission cannot prevent the prosecution
of offenses that do not amount to "true" crimes (under whatever criteria are
1 Lambert, 355 U.S. at 232 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
16 For the views of a proponent of prosecutorial guidelines, see Vorenberg, Decent
Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521 (1981); Vorenberg, Narrowing
the Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials, 1976 DUKE L.J. 651.
167 Prosecutorial discretion not to charge has generally been recognized and held not
to be judicially reviewable. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)
("[B]road [prosecutorial] discretion rests largely on the recognition that the decision to
prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review.").
168 See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1984).
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used to draw that line), but it can ensure that such crimes are treated at
sentencing like public welfare offenses. In truth, public welfare offenses have
been a subterranean part of our law for over a century, but only in the last
decade or so have substantial fines or criminal sentences been imposed for
their violation. Recognizing that the world is imperfect and that a doctri-
nally pure distinction between crimes and torts will never be observed by
lawmakers, the Sentencing Commission could still take as its task the imple-
mentation of Professor Cooter's distinction between prices and sanctions.169
Thus, for behavior that society wishes only to tax, fines should be framed so
as to force the actor to internalize costs, but for behavior that society wishes
to prohibit, a deliberately sharp and discontinuous jump should be struc-
tured into the sentencing guidelines.
Not all cases fit this simple dichotomy of pricing versus prohibiting. For
example, what should be done when the defendant (typically a corporation
or a corporate officer) is placed on notice that it is not in compliance with
some legal obligation and then seeks in good faith to bring itself into compli-
ance-but fails? In one case, the president of a corporation that owned an
open-air food storage warehouse was convicted for failing to correct a health
problem caused by bird infestation, even though he directed the design and
construction of an elaborate bird cage that would have adequately protected
the facility." Unfortunately, a .labor strike prevented the installation of the
device, with the result that the problem remained uncorrected when health
inspectors next visited the plant. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
conviction, rejecting the "objective impossibility" defense established by
Park.7' and noted with apparent approval the prosecution's argument that
the firm always had the option of shutting down the business until the device
was installed. 72 Such a judicial response poses the basic question: does soci-
ety value the productive capacity of this enterprise during the interim?
Arguments can be made on both sides of this question, but the potential
social loss from shutting down the firm and laying off its employees may be
disproportionate to the harm realistically threatened by the offense. Such a
169 Some may object that such a project violates the separation of powers. Yet, the
separation of powers claim, as applied to the United States Sentencing Commission, has
already been rejected by the Supreme Court. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361
(1989). The narrower claim that it exceeds statutory authority is more debatable, but my
thesis in this Article is only that the commission should be given such authority.
170 See United States v. Y. Hata & Co., 535 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1976).
171 United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
172 535 F.2d at 511 (holding that a corporation and its president were not powerless
when they could "correct the violation, even by suspending the corporation's food
warehousing activity if necessary"); cf. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219,
257 N.E.2d 870, 390 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970) (conditioning the lifting of an injunction on the
operation of a cement plant on the payment of damages to plaintiff, notwithstanding the
court's finding that the plant was indeed a nuisance).
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case presents a paradigm of the pricing versus prohibiting dilemma and sug-
gests that sometimes pricing is the more appropriate response.
B. An Agenda for the Sentencing Commission
An appropriate procedure would be to allow consideration of these ques-
tions at sentencing. Sentencing guidelines could respond in the following
general ways:
1. Strict Liability. In principle, strict liability offenses should not result
in incarceration or high financial penalties, unless the prosecution can show
at sentencing that the individual acted with at least the minimum level of
mens rea that American criminal law defines as "recklessness.' 73 Although
regulatory authorities maintain with some truth that they prosecute only
defendants, who, they believe, acted with actual knowledge, this issue is sel-
dom resolved at trial, at least if the statute dispenses with mens rea toward
the element in question. Absent legislation that appropriately frames this
issue, it should still be resolved at sentencing (albeit with lesser formality
and a lower burden of proof)before punishment above that appropriate for
traditional public welfare offenses could be imposed. 74
2. Fear. Nozick's basic claim-that the criminal law is primarily justi-
fied by the noncompensable fear that some unlawful actions impose on
others-deserves explicit recognition in any morally sophisticated system of
sentencing. Its role should be that of an aggravating factor. Obviously, such
a criteria distinguishes crimes, such as insider trading, from homicide. But
what kinds of fear count? Community values probably answer this question
and imply that fear of a financial loss is not the same as fear of injury or
illness. Note, however, that the fear need not be directly attributable to a
personal assault. Toxic dumping crimes, for example, may subject an even
larger proportion of the citizenry to fears that they are drinking contami-
173 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (requiring minimum culpability level of
recklessness, unless specific statute otherwise provides). Under § 2.02(2)(c),
"recklessness" is defined as "[conscious disregard of] a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the material element exists or will result from [the defendant's] conduct."
174 To some extent the sentencing guidelines for organizational offenders issued on
May 1, 1991 by the U.S. Sentencing Commission achieve this result. Under § 8C2.4, the
"base fine" is set at the greatest of (a) a specified amount from a table, (b) the pecuniary
gain from the crime, or (c) under some circumstances, the pecuniary loss from the crime.
In many cases, the pecuniary loss will vastly exceed the first two measures. Although the
guidelines do not apply to environmental offenses, an obvious example of an instance in
which the loss dwarfs all other measures is the Exxon Valdez disaster where Exxon
received no gain but caused immense loss. Under § 8C2.4, however, a corporation's fine
will be based on the "pecuniary loss from the offense caused by the organization, to the
extent that the loss was caused intentionally, knowingly or recklessly." In short,
pecuniary loss does not count for purposes of sentencing corporate offenders in cases of
negligent or strict liability. Effectively, this means that the state is not taking a
prohibitory approach to these offenses.
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nated water. Similarly, crimes involving concealed exposure of workers to
dangerous substances (e.g., asbestos) could fall under this same heading.
3. Industry Standards and Agency Rules. Hart's approach can be
faulted as backward-looking and anachronistic because it looks only to tradi-
tional moral standards. Perhaps unintentionally, it thus implicitly revives
the discredited malum in se versus malum prohibitum distinction. Often,
however, the regulatory rules imposed by an agency will have simply codi-
fied standards long recognized within an industry or other professional com-
munity. Significant departures from these standards may involve the same
degree of culpability within that specialized group as departures from pre-
vailing moral standards recognized universally within the larger community.
In short, if the conduct would be seen as wholly unjustified by those within
the field (who best understand it), it should be prohibited, not priced. Egre-
gious departures from professional norms should not be excused simply
because the rules involved were technical. In this light, consider again the
pending indictment of Eastern Airlines for failure to conduct adequate main-
tenance on its planes.' The gravity of such a crime can range from the
trivial to the very serious. How should a court appraise it? While industry
standards are never dispositive, 76 they provide the most useful benchmark
for measuring the culpability of such an offense. When well-established
industry standards are violated, the court's response should be the same as if
the conduct violated fundamental community standards.
4. Corporate Crime. Corporate crime can be distinctive in several
respects, but two respects bear special mention here. First, sometimes the
corporation has failed to comply with a standard toward which it was mak-
ing substantial progress, and, second, sometimes (but probably less often)
the crime can be the consequence of a "rogue" employee acting contrary to
specific instructions or corporate policy. The Y Hata & Co. case,'77 in
which a strike prevented the corporate officer from installing the necessary
bird cage around an open-air food storage warehouse, illustrates the first
scenario. The court's view that the business could have been shut down if
compliance were otherwise physically impossible seems extreme, because it
denies that there is any social value in the continued operation of the plant
pending full compliance. While one can easily criticize the court's decision,
the more difficult question arrives at sentencing. Having rejected the
defense, can the court still consider this same factor as a mitigating factor
that reduces the fine? This Article's answer would be yes, at least when the
1' See supra note 103.
176 See, e.g., The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (1932). In holding that a tugboat
operator had been negligent in not maintaining a radio on board his boat, Judge Learned
Hand refused to be bound by industry standards, arguing that "in most cases reasonable
prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never the measure; a whole
[industry] may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices. ...
Courts must in the end say what is required."
177 535 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1976); see supra note 170 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 71:193
TOR T/CRIME DISTINCTION
crime is essentially a public welfare offense that should be priced, not prohib-
ited. This conclusion rests, however, on the defendant's good faith in
attempting to correct the problem. Once again, behavior that has social util-
ity should be priced, not prohibited. Deliberate defiance, however, lacks
such utility and should be prohibited because it undercuts the socializing
role of the criminal law.
The second recurring element in corporate crime is the claim that a
"rogue" employee was responsible. Often, this claim is overstated, because
the so-called rogue may be responding to subtle (or not so subtle) intra-
organization signals and pressures that place profit above law compliance.
178
Indeed, middle managers are often almost fungible, with the result that the
corporation can replace those employees who are caught with little harm to
itself-if the fine will be modest so long as senior corporate personnel are not
implicated. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that cases arise in which a
rogue employee does appear to have frustrated a good faith corporate
attempt to comply with the law. 179 In these cases, the corporation's culpa-
bility seems low, and a pricing approach would be appropriate, whose intent
would be to induce the corporation to install improved monitoring controls.
The problem with this answer is that any corporation can adopt a compli-
ance plan and it may be difficult for the prosecution to prove, except in the
most egregious case, that it was cosmetically manipulated. When internal
monitoring amounts to a sham, the conclusion seems obvious that it lacks
social utility, and a prohibitory approach becomes appropriate. Thus, a
sharp, discontinuous jump in corporate penalties is appropriate when there
is evidence that senior corporate officials knew of, or "recklessly" tolerated,
the criminal behavior or sought to outflank monitoring controls.
But how does one draft guidelines that distinguish "true" from "cos-
metic" monitoring? One approach would be to grant a provisional sentenc-
ing credit for seemingly adequate monitoring controls, but then treat this
credit as a suspended sentence which is forfeited if there is any repetition of
the behavior (as evidenced by either subsequent civil or criminal findings
during a period of corporate probation). i" Such an approach takes much of
178 For a general discussion of this theme, see Coffee, "No Soul To Damn, No Body To
Kick".: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L.
REV. 386 (1981).
19 In United States v. Starr, 535 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1976), the evidence at least
suggested that a disgruntled janitor frustrated the company's attempt to cure a rat
infestation problem that eventually resulted in a criminal prosecution under § 301(k) of
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act (the same statute that was used in United
States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975)).
180 I have elsewhere made a specific proposal to treat any sentencing credit for
compliance plans or cooperation with the prosecution as a suspended sentence which
would be imposed (following a probation revocation hearing) if the corporation were
found to have violated a related legal standard during the period of probation. For
example, if the criminal fine under a "prohibitory" policy would be $2,000,000 but under
a "pricing" policy would be $500,000, the court under this proposal would impose a
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the burden off the court by assuming that cosmetic monitoring will ulti-
mately result in future violations, and the time to be punitive is at that future
moment. Above all, corporate recidivism merits prohibition, not pricing.
'CONCLUSION
Ultimately, appropriate sentencing policy is a function of one's theory of
the criminal law. Those who view the criminal law as a "pricing" system
can make a coherent case for their view that Sentencing Commission guide-
lines for corporate offenders are too high and that courts should reduce the
sentences currently imposed on corporations by recognizing any of a variety
of offsets or mitigating factors.'"' In contrast, those who believe that the
criminal law is intended to prohibit and not price can view high fines with
equanimity and argue that if they are too severe corporations have only to
obey the law to avoid them.
Although this Article has argued that the criminal law should normally
prohibit, and not price, it has also recognized that the expansion of the crim-
inal law into formerly civil areas of law and the increasing departures from
the traditional "method" of the criminal law make it difficult to state this
policy as an iron rule. An either/or choice is also unnecessary. Rather,
pricing is appropriate precisely in those areas where the criminal law has
relaxed its usual requirement of mens rea or has abandoned its normal hos-
tility to vicarious responsibility. Clearly, corporate criminal responsibility
straddles this line, and thus distinctions must be drawn that the current fed-
eral law of corporate criminal liability does not make.
How can these distinctions best be drawn? The sentencing determination
today represents the only point in our criminal justice system where it
remains feasible to preserve the distinction between "true" crimes and public
welfare offenses. To say that this can be done is not to claim that such dis-
tinctions are today being drawn or will be in the near future. Procedural
reform, clearer sentencing guidelines that are more focused on culpability
factors, and numerous other steps would be desirable. Still, if the criminal
law is not to be corrupted into simply a utilitarian instrument for administer-
ing legal threats, reform at the sentencing stage is the last, best hope.
$2,000,000 fine, but suspend $1,500,000 of it for the period of probation, subject to
compliance with probation conditions requiring it not to engage in any regulatory
violations of a related nature. See Coffee, "Carrot and Stick" Sentencing: Structuring
Incentives for Organizational Defendants, 3 Fed. Sentencing Rep. 126, 128 (1990).
181 It should be emphasized that a pricing policy does not necessarily mean modest
fines. The issue rather is the size of the costs to be internalized by the defendant. Lest my
own position on the U.S. Sentencing Commission's guidelines for organizational offenders
be misunderstood, I should clarify that I believe they grant an excessive credit for
internal compliance programs. See Coffee, Big Corporations, Off the Hook, LEGAL
TIMES, May 6, 1991, at 22.
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